NIZKP Authentication Using XOR Hashing to Reduce Handshake Latency
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Solution Overview
Problem
Conventional SSL authentication methods are vulnerable to man-in-the-middle and hacked server attacks, require certificate management, and suffer from slow connection handshakes, especially over long distances, due to the need for packet ping-pong and transmission of sensitive information.
Innovation Solution
Non-interactive zero knowledge proof (NIZKP) authentication, which uses exclusive disjunction operations and extraction processes to authenticate communications without sharing passwords, leveraging unique pre-computed hashes and timestamps to ensure security and efficiency, eliminating the need for expensive cryptographic code on the server side and reducing latency by eliminating the ping-pong protocol.
Engineering Contradictions & Design Principles
Engineering Contradiction Analysis
1Speed
If conventional SSL authentication is used, then authentication can be performed, but latency increases due to ping-pong connection handshakes
Solution Approach 1:
The patent pre-computes and stores authentication hashes on the server side before actual authentication occurs. During authentication, the server simply compares the client-provided hash with the pre-computed hash, eliminating the need for multiple back-and-forth communication rounds and reducing latency significantly.
Solution Approach 2:
The patent extracts the authentication verification step from the traditional SSL handshake process by using zero-knowledge proof mechanisms. This allows the client to prove knowledge of the password without transmitting the password itself, reducing the number of communication rounds needed.
2Reliability
If SSL authentication transmits plain text username and password over encrypted tunnel, then authentication can be performed, but security is compromised against man-in-the-middle attacks
Solution Approach 1:
The patent introduces cryptographic hash functions as an intermediary mechanism. Instead of transmitting the password directly, the client computes a hash of the password combined with a random salt and transmits this hash through the encrypted tunnel. The server performs the same computation and compares hashes, ensuring that even if the tunnel is compromised, the actual password remains secure.
Solution Approach 2:
The patent uses cryptographic hashing to create a copy of the password information (the hash value) that can be transmitted safely. This hash copy contains sufficient information for authentication but cannot be reverse-engineered to reveal the original password, protecting against interception attacks.
3Reliability
If SSL authentication transmits plain text username and password, then authentication can be performed, but security is compromised against hacked server attacks
Solution Approach 1:
The patent introduces cryptographic hash functions as an intermediary mechanism. Instead of transmitting the password directly, the client computes a hash of the password combined with a random salt and transmits this hash through the encrypted tunnel. The server performs the same computation and compares hashes, ensuring that even if the tunnel is compromised, the actual password remains secure.
4Reliability
If SSL certificates are used for authentication, then security can be enhanced, but device complexity increases due to certificate management
Solution Approach 1:
The patent replaces complex, long-lived SSL certificates with simpler, ephemeral cryptographic credentials. Each authentication session uses a newly generated random salt and hash pair that is discarded after use, eliminating the need for complex certificate issuance, renewal, and revocation management while maintaining strong security.
5Reliability
If expensive cryptographic code is implemented on both server and client sides, then security can be enhanced, but productivity decreases due to computational overhead
Solution Approach 1:
The patent implements a self-service authentication model where the client independently generates the proof of knowledge (hash of password and salt) and sends it to the server. The server's role is reduced to simple hash comparison against pre-computed values, minimizing the cryptographic computation required on the server side and improving overall system productivity.
Data Source
AI summary
Security-enhancing devices, systems, methods, and non-transitory computer-readable media for performing non-interactive zero knowledge proof (NIZKP) authentication. In one embodiment, a computing device includes a memory and an electronic processor. The memory stores a NIZKP authentication program and a plurality of unique passwords. The electronic processor is configured to receive a first random value from an electronic source, generate a second random value by performing an exclusive disjunction operation on the first random value with a first password of the plurality of unique passwords, perform an extraction operation on the second random value, determine whether the extraction operation performed on the second random value extracted a non-random value from the second random value, and responsive to determining that the extraction operation performed on the second random value extracted the non-random value from the second random value, authenticate communications with the electronic source.