Nuclear Safety System Two-Division Voting Logic
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Solution Overview
Problem
Current nuclear power plant safety systems require four divisions with two levels of multi-division voting to meet single failure criterion compliance, spurious actuation prevention, and testing/failure tolerance, which is costly and complex.
Innovation Solution
A safety system for nuclear power plants is designed with two divisions, utilizing enhanced voting logic and optical communication to share calculation results, allowing for two-out-of-four voting and A-out-of-B voting configurations to generate safety demand signals, reducing the need for additional divisions and complexity.
Engineering Contradictions & Design Principles
Engineering Contradiction Analysis
1Reliability
If four divisions with two levels of multi-division voting are used, then single failure criterion compliance and spurious actuation prevention are achieved, but device complexity and capital cost increase
Solution Approach 1:
The patent merges the functions of four separate safety divisions into two integrated safety divisions. Each safety division contains multiple diverse functional elements (sensors, processors, actuators) that work together to provide the redundancy and failure tolerance previously achieved only through four separate divisions. This consolidation reduces device complexity while maintaining single failure criterion compliance through the diverse functional architecture within each division.
Solution Approach 2:
Each safety division is designed as a universal, multi-functional unit capable of performing multiple safety functions simultaneously. The diverse functional elements within each division (including different sensor types, processing methods, and actuation mechanisms) enable a single division to provide the reliability equivalent of multiple specialized divisions, thereby reducing overall system complexity.
2Reliability
If four divisions with two levels of multi-division voting are used, then spurious actuation prevention is achieved, but capital cost and operations maintenance cost increase
Solution Approach 1:
The patent consolidates four separate safety divisions into two, directly reducing the quantity of equipment, materials, and components required. This merging reduces capital costs for equipment procurement, installation, and commissioning, while also reducing ongoing operations and maintenance costs for fewer physical systems. The diverse functional architecture within each merged division maintains spurious actuation prevention capabilities.
Solution Approach 2:
The multi-functional design of each safety division allows a reduced number of systems to perform the safety functions previously requiring four separate divisions. This universality reduces the total quantity of equipment needed while maintaining the spurious actuation prevention capability through diverse functional cross-checking within each division.
3Reliability
If four divisions are used, then testing and failure tolerance are achieved, but device complexity increases
Solution Approach 1:
The patent merges four divisions into two, reducing the number of systems requiring testing and maintenance. Each merged division incorporates diverse functional elements that can be tested independently, simplifying the testing regimen compared to coordinating tests across four separate divisions. The failure tolerance capability is maintained through the diverse functional architecture that allows continued operation even when some elements fail.
Solution Approach 2:
Within each safety division, the diverse functional elements are segmented into distinct, independently testable components. This internal segmentation allows for simplified testing of individual functional elements while maintaining the integrated failure tolerance capability of the overall division, reducing the complexity of system-level testing compared to four separate divisions.
Data Source
AI summary
A safety system for a nuclear power plant includes first through fourth sensors; a first division, including a first calculation module that determines first and second calculation results based on signals from the first and second sensors, a first data-sharing module for sharing the first and second calculation results with a second division, and a first voting logic for generating a first safety demand signal based on the first through fourth calculation results; and the second division, including a second calculation module for determining the third and fourth calculation results based on signals from the third and fourth sensors, a second data-sharing module for sharing the third and fourth calculation results with the first division, and a second voting logic for generating a second safety demand signal based on the first, second, third, and fourth calculation results, wherein the first through fourth sensors each monitor the same plant parameters.