OKVS-Based OPRF Repetition Against Random Substitution Attacks
Find Innovative SolutionsGenerate Solutions
Solution Overview
Problem
Existing oblivious pseudo-random function (OPRF) protocols based on oblivious key-value store (OKVS) algorithms are vulnerable to random substitution attacks by malicious receivers, and the communication overhead increases significantly during such attacks.
Innovation Solution
Implement a method involving multiple applications of OPRF protocols using OKVS, adjusting bit counts and probability bounds to minimize information leakage and communication, including configuring first and second bit counts based on specific probability bounds to prevent attackers from obtaining additional data while reducing overall communication.
Engineering Contradictions & Design Principles
Engineering Contradiction Analysis
1Reliability
If a single OPRF protocol is applied, then communication overhead is low, but security against random substitution attacks is insufficient
Solution Approach 1:
The patent divides the security verification process into multiple independent OPRF protocol executions. Instead of relying on a single protocol instance, the system executes the OPRF protocol multiple times with different inputs, where each execution provides an additional layer of security verification. This segmentation allows the system to achieve stronger security guarantees while maintaining the modular structure of the original protocol.
Solution Approach 2:
The patent implements preliminary verification steps before the main data processing operation. By executing OPRF protocols in advance with test inputs and verifying the results, the system establishes security guarantees beforehand. This preliminary action prevents malicious receivers from performing random substitution attacks during the actual data processing phase.
2Reliability
If multiple OPRF protocols are applied to prevent attacks, then security is improved, but communication overhead increases significantly
Solution Approach 1:
The patent optimizes the parameters of the OPRF protocol to reduce communication overhead. By carefully selecting the security parameter λ and the number of repetitions r, the system achieves the desired security level while minimizing the amount of data transmitted. The parameter configuration balances security requirements with communication efficiency.
Solution Approach 2:
The patent extracts only the essential verification elements from the OPRF protocol execution. Instead of transmitting all intermediate computation results, the system identifies and transmits only the critical verification data needed to detect random substitution attacks. This extraction approach maintains security while significantly reducing communication overhead.
3Loss of information
If bit counts are increased to prevent information leakage, then security is improved, but communication overhead increases
Solution Approach 1:
The patent carefully configures the bit counts of hash data and PRF data based on the security parameter λ. By setting the hash data bit count to λ bits and the PRF data bit count to 2λ bits, the system achieves the required information leakage prevention while optimizing communication efficiency. This parameter configuration ensures that the probability of successful attacks remains negligible.
Data Source
Figure 1
Figure 2
Figure 3~4
AI summary
The present disclosure relates to a method for multiple applications of an oblivious pseudo-random function protocol between a receiver and a sender based on an oblivious key-value store algorithm, and a terminal device using the same, and a method for multiple applications of an oblivious pseudo-random function protocol according to an embodiment of the present disclosure may include the steps of: inputting, by the receiver, a first key-value pair between target data and hash data corresponding to the target data to receive first PRF data generated according to a first OPRF protocol based on the OKVS; and inputting, by the receiver, a second key-value pair between the target data and the first PRF data to receive second PRF data generated according to a second OPRF protocol based on the OKVS.