Leadless Pacemaker Patient Device Secure Communication
Find Innovative SolutionsGenerate Solutions
Solution Overview
Problem
Leadless pacemakers lack secure communication methods due to their low power design, making them vulnerable to cyber-attacks and unable to implement encryption or other cybersecurity measures, which is exacerbated by the need for high energy efficiency and the deep implantation within the body.
Innovation Solution
A patient device with a split communication system, featuring an immutable second controlling device for secure communication with the leadless pacemaker and an updatable first controlling device for wireless communication with a service device, ensuring secure and attack-resistant data exchange by limiting the functionality and data exchange between the two controlling devices.
Engineering Contradictions & Design Principles
Engineering Contradiction Analysis
1Reliability
If encryption or secure communication techniques are implemented in the leadless pacemaker, then security against cyber-attacks is improved, but energy consumption increases significantly
Solution Approach 1:
The system is divided into two separate controlling devices: a first controllable device for managing communication and a second immutable device for ensuring security. This segmentation allows the security functions to be isolated in a dedicated component that consumes minimal energy, while the main controllable device handles higher-energy communication tasks. The separation enables security operations to be performed independently without burdening the pacemaker's limited power supply.
Solution Approach 2:
A patient device acts as an intermediary between the service device and the leadless pacemaker. This intermediary handles the complex secure communication protocols and encryption operations, allowing the pacemaker itself to use simpler, lower-power communication methods. The intermediary device performs the energy-intensive security functions externally, protecting the pacemaker from high energy consumption while maintaining robust security.
2Adaptability or versatility
If the controllable device is made updatable to fix security vulnerabilities, then adaptability is improved, but security against remote attacks worsens due to potential compromise
Solution Approach 1:
The system separates updateable components from immutable components. The first controllable device can be updated to address security vulnerabilities and improve functionality, while the second immutable device maintains permanent security credentials that cannot be compromised through updates. This segmentation allows the system to benefit from software improvements without risking the security foundation.
Solution Approach 2:
The immutable second device provides a pre-established security foundation that cushions the system against attacks targeting updateable components. Even if the first controllable device is compromised through updates or exploits, the immutable device maintains security integrity, providing a safety buffer that prevents complete system compromise.
3Reliability
If inductive communication requires close proximity between implant and programmer, then security is improved, but ease of operation worsens due to limited remote monitoring capability
Solution Approach 1:
The patient device serves as an intermediary that extends the secure inductive communication range. It can establish secure connections with the pacemaker at close proximity and then communicate with service devices remotely through other communication channels. This intermediary approach maintains the security benefits of close-proximity inductive communication while enabling remote monitoring capabilities through the mediating device.
Applied Scientific Principles
This section explains which scientific principles are used to turn an abstract innovation direction into a practical engineering solution.
Function Achieved in This Case
This solution enables secure remote interrogation of leadless pacemakers while preventing cyber-attacks by maintaining secure communication between the patient device and the pacemaker, even if the patient device is compromised, through the use of inductive telemetry and immutability of the second controlling device.
Implementation Method 1
Leadless pacemakers try to use as much of the energy stored in their battery to support pacemaker functionality over as long a service time as possible... an inductive communication interface can be exploited to achieve a patient triggered remote interrogation
Data Source
AI summary
A patient device for a leadless pacemaker communication system is disclosed. The patient device is configured to receive and transmit data from and to a service device as well as from and to a leadless pacemaker. The patient device comprises a first controlling device for controlling communication from and to a service device and a second controlling device for controlling communication from and to a leadless pacemaker. The second controlling device is immutable.