Partitioned FPGA Zero-Trust Boot for Quantum-Resilient Data Security
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Solution Overview
Problem
Current encryption methods are vulnerable to advanced computing power and quantum algorithms, and traditional computing devices lack robust security measures against unauthorized access, especially during the unsecured boot-up phase, making sensitive data susceptible to breaches.
Innovation Solution
Implementing a programmable integrated circuit, such as an FPGA, with partitioned segments that include factory-installed secrets to convert data to an untranslated state, requiring user authentication before allowing access to translated data, thereby securing data transfer, storage, and execution.
Engineering Contradictions & Design Principles
Engineering Contradiction Analysis
1Reliability
If traditional encryption methods are used to protect data, then data security is improved, but computing power increases and quantum algorithms can break the encryption
Solution Approach 1:
The patent segments data into multiple shares using secret sharing schemes, where no single share reveals information about the original data. This segmentation approach moves security from relying on computational hardness to relying on information theory, making quantum attacks ineffective since quantum computers cannot reconstruct the data from individual shares without all necessary components.
Solution Approach 2:
The patent introduces trusted execution environments (TEEs) and secure enclaves as intermediaries between data storage and processing. These intermediaries hold cryptographic keys and secret shares in protected hardware, allowing data to remain encrypted while enabling authorized computation. This intermediary layer prevents both quantum attacks and traditional breaches by isolating critical security functions in hardened environments.
2Ease of operation
If encryption keys are shared across multiple customers to enable data access, then ease of operation is improved, but security is worsened due to shared secrets
Solution Approach 1:
The patent divides master encryption keys into multiple secret shares distributed to different customers or systems. Each participant holds only a portion of the key material, making it useless without the other shares. This enables collaborative data access where multiple parties can contribute to decryption without any single party having full key control, thus maintaining both security and operational flexibility.
Solution Approach 2:
The patent implements dynamic key management where secret shares and access policies can be modified without reissuing all credentials. Authorized users can be added or removed from access groups, and key shares can be rotated or revoked independently. This dynamic approach maintains ease of operation for changing organizational structures while preserving security through continuous key material protection.
3Ease of operation
If conventional login sessions are implemented after operating system boot, then ease of operation is improved, but security is worsened during the unsecured boot-up phase
Solution Approach 1:
The patent implements preliminary authentication mechanisms that occur before the operating system fully boots. Secure enrollment of user credentials and establishment of trusted execution environments happen during hardware initialization, before any untrusted software runs. This preliminary action ensures that authentication infrastructure is in place and secured before the vulnerable window of traditional boot-up sequences.
Solution Approach 2:
The patent introduces secure enclaves and trusted execution environments as intermediaries that operate independently of the main operating system during boot. These hardware-based intermediaries establish secure authentication channels before the OS loads, preventing attackers from compromising the boot process through traditional software-based attacks. The intermediary TEE validates credentials and establishes security contexts in a protected environment.
Data Source
AI summary
Generally, systems and methods for securely establishing data transfer, storage, and execution are presented. The system may comprise a computing device that comprises at least one programmable integrated circuit. The programmable integrated circuit may comprise multiple independently loadable partitioned segments. A first partitioned segment of the programmable integrated circuit may comprise one or more factory-installed secrets in the form of data, wherein the factory-installed secrets may be configured to convert data from an untranslated state to a translated state, and vice versa. A second partitioned segment may comprise storage-at-rest data for at least one authenticable user of the computing device. The computing device may comprise at least one storage medium that comprises data, including data comprising one or more boot instructions for the computing device, that may be in an untranslated state. Therefore, the computer is not a computer, until it acquires a trusting user's authentication, thereby unlocking its commands.