Payload Inspection System for Zero-Day Threat Detection

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Solution Overview

Problem

Current malware detection methods are ineffective in identifying and neutralizing zero-day exploits, which are hidden using steganographic techniques or unknown to anti-malware tools, posing a significant risk to computer systems and networks.

Innovation Solution

A payload inspection system employing bitwise scanning techniques to detect encoded software or data in data communication streams without prior knowledge of its characteristics, using a sealed environment with a single point of entry and exit, and employing counter-rotating inspection kernels and shape-shifting protocols to verify the integrity of communications.

Engineering Contradictions & Design Principles

VSEngineering Contradiction Analysis

1Measurement precision

If signature-based malware scanning is used, then detection of known malware is improved, but detection of zero-day exploits deteriorates

Engineering Contradiction:
Improvedetection accuracyVSAvoiddetection capability
Core Design Contradiction:
Measurement precisionVSAdaptability or versatility

Solution Approach 1:

The patent segments the malware detection process into multiple independent inspection kernels that analyze different aspects of data streams separately. Each kernel focuses on specific patterns or characteristics, allowing the system to detect both known signatures and unknown zero-day exploits through aggregated results from multiple specialized inspectors

Inventive Principle:
Principle #1Segmentation

Solution Approach 2:

The inspection system is designed with multi-functional capability to perform both signature-based detection and anomaly-based detection. The same infrastructure handles known malware patterns while simultaneously identifying unknown threats through behavioral analysis, eliminating the need for separate specialized systems

Inventive Principle:
Principle #6Universality (Multi-functionality)

2Object-generated harmful factors

If steganographic techniques are used to hide malware, then malware concealment is improved, but detection capability deteriorates

Engineering Contradiction:
Improvemalware concealmentVSAvoiddetection difficulty
Core Design Contradiction:
Object-generated harmful factorsVSDifficulty of detecting and measuring

Solution Approach 1:

The patent applies inspection kernels that analyze data streams across multiple dimensions simultaneously - examining not just the obvious content but also metadata, encoding patterns, and structural characteristics. This multi-dimensional approach reveals steganographically hidden malware by detecting anomalies in dimensions that differ from normal data patterns

Inventive Principle:
Principle #17Another dimension (Dimensionality change)

Solution Approach 2:

The system replaces traditional pattern-matching mechanisms with advanced analytical kernels that use statistical and behavioral analysis. Instead of relying solely on known malware signatures, the inspection system substitutes mechanical signature matching with intelligent anomaly detection that can identify concealed threats through their behavioral characteristics

Inventive Principle:
Principle #28Mechanics substitution (Replace mechanical system)

3Reliability

If firewall protection is implemented, then network security is improved, but ingress of sophisticated malware deteriorates

Engineering Contradiction:
Improvenetwork securityVSAvoidmalware ingress
Core Design Contradiction:
ReliabilityVSObject-affected harmful factors

Solution Approach 1:

The patent implements preliminary inspection of data streams before they reach the protected network. Inspection kernels analyze incoming data for malicious patterns and anomalies upfront, preventing sophisticated malware from entering the network in the first place. This proactive approach strengthens firewall protection by adding a preprocessing layer that identifies threats before they can exploit firewall vulnerabilities

Inventive Principle:
Principle #10Preliminary action

Data Source

PatentUS10601783B2System and method for digital payload inspection
Publication Date: 2020.03.24 MYCROFT SECURED COMPUTING CORP
  • US10601783B2 patent drawing
  • US10601783B2 patent drawing
  • US10601783B2 patent drawing

AI summary

Use of an ancillary proxy server can be used as a man-in-the-middle agent, for example, as part of a firewall system that brackets the inputs and outputs of the payload inspection system, to intercept, collect and store encryption keys and certificates. Possession of these keys and certificates would allow the un-encryption of data streams before processing of the data stream by the payload inspection system. A data stream may be duplicated and held until released by the payload inspection system or re-encrypted after processing by the payload inspection system as needed.