Payment Terminal Cryptographic Segregation for Multi-Operator Use
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Solution Overview
Problem
Existing payment terminals lack the ability to securely manage multiple operators' access for payment transactions, leading to potential privacy and security issues when used by different entities, such as airlines at boarding gates.
Innovation Solution
A method and system that configure payment terminals to enable cryptographic segregation between operators by using operator- and terminal-specific transport keys, derived from base-derivation keys and terminal-identification numbers, allowing remote control of access without physical contact, ensuring secure and operator-selective usage.
Engineering Contradictions & Design Principles
Engineering Contradiction Analysis
1Adaptability or versatility
If a payment terminal is shared by multiple operators, then the utility and versatility of the terminal is improved, but the security and privacy protection between different operators deteriorates
Solution Approach 1:
The payment terminal is segmented into multiple isolated cryptographic environments, with each operator having their own dedicated cryptographic context. This segmentation is achieved through separate key pairs, certificate storage areas, and transaction processing channels for each operator, ensuring that cryptographic operations of one operator cannot interfere with or access another operator's data.
Solution Approach 2:
Each operator is assigned unique cryptographic parameters and security attributes tailored to their specific requirements. The terminal maintains different cryptographic configurations, key hierarchies, and access control policies for each operator, allowing customized security levels and operational characteristics for each user while sharing the same physical terminal.
2Reliability
If physical contact is required for key injection, then the security control over key distribution is improved, but the ease of operation and remote management capability deteriorates
Solution Approach 1:
A secure communication intermediary layer is established between the key management system and the payment terminal. This intermediary uses encrypted communication channels and authenticated protocols to transmit cryptographic keys and configuration data remotely, eliminating the need for physical contact while maintaining security through cryptographic protection of the transmission process.
Solution Approach 2:
The physical mechanical process of key injection is replaced with an electronic/digital key distribution mechanism. Instead of physically loading keys into the terminal through contact-based methods, the system uses network-based cryptographic protocols to securely transmit and install keys remotely, substituting mechanical interaction with electronic communication secured by cryptography.
3Productivity
If multiple operators use the same terminal, then the productivity and resource utilization is improved, but the complexity of key management increases
Solution Approach 1:
A universal key management architecture is implemented that can serve multiple operators through a single integrated system. The key management module provides standardized interfaces and unified control mechanisms that work across all operators, allowing centralized management of cryptographic assets while supporting diverse operator requirements through configurable parameters and policies.
Solution Approach 2:
The key management system is designed to be dynamic and adaptive, automatically configuring cryptographic parameters, generating operator-specific keys, and managing certificate lifecycles based on operator identity and requirements. The system can dynamically allocate cryptographic resources, adjust security policies, and manage key rotation without manual intervention, reducing operational complexity despite serving multiple operators.
Data Source
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AI summary
A method is described of configuring a payment terminal to become usable as a payment terminal shared by a plurality of operators with cryptographic segregation between the different operators of the payment terminal. An operator- and terminal-specific transport key is provided to the payment terminal. An operator- and terminal-specific initial-encryption key is derived, by the payment provider, from an operator-specific base-derivation key using the terminal-identification number, or an additional identification number of the payment terminal. The operator- and terminal-specific initial-encryption key is transmitted to the payment terminal, and is decrypted at the payment terminal. An operator- and transaction-specific encryption key is derived, both at the payment provider and the payment terminal, from the operator- and terminal-specific initial-encryption key using a transaction-specific number associated with this transaction, when performing a transaction with the payment terminal.