Payment Terminal Attestation for Offline Tamper Validation
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Solution Overview
Problem
Payment terminals are vulnerable to attacks and tampering, especially in offline scenarios, as existing systems lack effective methods to ensure the security and integrity of payment transactions, particularly when not connected to a central server.
Innovation Solution
Implementing an augmented tamper and fraud detection methodology using trust routines and attestation processes, where a payment reader or server determines the security of a payment device by checking for tampering through hashing, scanning memory, and gathering metadata, and issuing attestation tickets for trusted devices, enabling secure transactions both online and offline.
Engineering Contradictions & Design Principles
Engineering Contradiction Analysis
1Reliability
If payment terminals use traditional tamper detection methods (tamper switches, tamper meshes), then physical tampering can be detected, but sophisticated attackers can bypass these measures and attacks can be performed without physical access
Solution Approach 1:
The patent replaces mechanical tamper detection systems (tamper switches, tamper meshes) with a software-based trust routine system that executes code and validates attestation tickets. This substitution enables detection of logical and software-based attacks that mechanical systems cannot detect, while maintaining protection against physical tampering through the same trust routine framework.
Solution Approach 2:
The system dynamically changes operational parameters by adjusting trust routines and attestation requirements based on transaction risk levels. Low-risk transactions use simplified verification, while high-risk transactions trigger more stringent attestation checks, allowing the system to adapt to varying threat levels without compromising security for all transactions.
2Reliability
If payment terminals perform comprehensive security checks and scans, then fraud and tampering can be detected, but processing time increases and system complexity grows
Solution Approach 1:
The system performs security validation in advance by requiring payment devices to present attestation tickets before transactions occur. The trust routine validates these tickets preemptively, ensuring security checks are completed before payment processing begins, thus preventing time loss during actual transactions.
Solution Approach 2:
The system applies partial security validation based on transaction characteristics. For low-value or low-risk transactions, simplified trust routine validation is sufficient, while high-value or suspicious transactions receive more comprehensive security scrutiny. This selective approach reduces average processing time while maintaining security for critical transactions.
3Reliability
If payment terminals validate devices against multiple test criteria, then security against various attack vectors is improved, but device complexity and resource consumption increase
Solution Approach 1:
The trust routine serves multiple functions: it validates attestation tickets, executes security tests, detects tampering, and verifies device integrity. By consolidating these diverse security functions into a single multi-functional trust routine framework, the system achieves comprehensive security coverage without proportionally increasing complexity.
Solution Approach 2:
The patent introduces an intermediary component that manages the complexity of multiple security tests. This intermediary layer coordinates test execution, aggregates results, and presents unified validation outcomes, shielding the main payment terminal logic from the complexity of individual test criteria while maintaining comprehensive security validation.
4Reliability
If payment terminals perform offline security validation, then security is maintained without central server connection, but the terminal must store and process security criteria locally increasing memory and processing requirements
Solution Approach 1:
The system extracts only the essential security validation logic and minimal test criteria from the central server environment and stores them locally in the payment terminal. By taking out only the critical components needed for offline validation rather than storing complete security databases, the system achieves offline security capability with minimized local storage requirements.
Data Source
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AI summary
Disclosed herein is a method and system to determine whether a payment terminal has been tampered with based on a comparison of attestation data received from the payment terminal, for example in an offline mode when an otherwise secure remote server cannot be reached. If the determination yields that the request has been approved, the terminal generates an attestation ticket having one or more validity conditions, wherein the validity conditions include expiration time that indicates the time after which the attestation ticket becomes invalid. The attestation ticket can be used as long as it is valid or until another trigger causes the ticket to be invalidated or regenerated.