PC5 Unicast RRC Security Key Derivation for WTRU Signaling

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Solution Overview

Problem

Existing wireless communication systems lack secure Radio Resource Control (RRC) signaling over the PC5 interface for unicast communication, which is crucial for ensuring data integrity and confidentiality in devices like autonomous vehicles and IoT devices.

Innovation Solution

Implementing methods and systems for secured RRC signaling over the PC5 interface by deriving security keys for both the user plane (U-plane) and control plane (C-plane) using integrity-protected information exchanged between WTRUs, ensuring secure communication.

Engineering Contradictions & Design Principles

VSEngineering Contradiction Analysis

1Reliability

If secured RRC signaling is implemented over PC5 interface for unicast communication, then security and integrity of wireless communication is enhanced, but device complexity and implementation difficulty increase

Engineering Contradiction:
Improvesecurity and integrityVSAvoidimplementation complexity
Core Design Contradiction:
ReliabilityVSDevice complexity

Solution Approach 1:

The security mechanism is segmented into distinct components: first security information (e.g., first root key and first derived keys) for initial communication security, and second security information (e.g., second root key and second derived keys) for RRC signaling security. This segmentation allows each security layer to be independently managed and implemented, reducing overall system complexity while maintaining comprehensive security coverage.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #1Segmentation

Solution Approach 2:

The first security information is established preliminarily before RRC signaling occurs. The WTRU derives first derived keys from the first root key and uses these to protect initial communication. This preliminary security setup simplifies the subsequent RRC signaling process, as the basic security framework is already in place before the more complex RRC security layer is activated.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #10Preliminary action

2Reliability

If separate security key derivation for U-plane and C-plane is implemented, then communication security is strengthened, but processing overhead and complexity increase

Engineering Contradiction:
Improvecommunication securityVSAvoidprocessing complexity
Core Design Contradiction:
ReliabilityVSDevice complexity

Solution Approach 1:

The key derivation process is segmented into two distinct pathways: one for U-plane communication using first root keys and first derived keys, and another for C-plane RRC signaling using second root keys and second derived keys. This segmentation ensures that each plane has its own dedicated security credentials, preventing cross-plane security vulnerabilities while allowing independent optimization of each security pathway.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #1Segmentation

Solution Approach 2:

Different security qualities are applied locally to different communication planes. The U-plane receives security protection through first derived keys optimized for user data communication, while the C-plane receives enhanced protection through second derived keys specifically designed for control signaling. This local quality differentiation strengthens overall security without requiring uniform complex processing across all communication types.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #3Local quality

Data Source

PatentUS12501258B2Methods, apparatus and systems for secured radio resource control (RRC) signaling over a PC5 interface for unicast communication
Publication Date: 2025.12.16 INTERDIGITAL PATENT HOLDINGS INC
  • US12501258B2 patent drawing
  • US12501258B2 patent drawing
  • US12501258B2 patent drawing

AI summary

Method, apparatus and systems are disclosed that may be implemented in a Wireless Transmit/Receive Unit (WTRU) for unicast communication with another WTRU. The method may include sending, by the WTRU to the other WTRU via a PC5 interface, a communication request indicating first security information for the WTRU and receiving, by the WTRU from the other WTRU via the PC5 interface, information which is integrity protected indicating second security information for the other WTRU. The method may also include deriving, by the WTRU from the indicated second security information, a first set of security keys for communication via a first layer using the U-plane and a second set of security keys for communication via a second layer using the C-plane; and sending, by the WTRU to the other WTRU via the PC5 interface, a message that is at least integrity protected using the derived first set of keys.