PC5 Unicast RRC Signaling With Split Security Key Derivation

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Solution Overview

Problem

Existing wireless communication systems lack secure Radio Resource Control (RRC) signaling over the PC5 interface for unicast communication, which is essential for ensuring secure communication between devices, particularly in environments where security and security are not addressed in the context of the PC5 interface.

Innovation Solution

Implementing methods and apparatus for secured RRC signaling over the PC5 interface by deriving security keys for communication layers using integrity protection, ensuring secure communication between WTRUs.

Engineering Contradictions & Design Principles

VSEngineering Contradiction Analysis

1Adaptability or versatility

If RRC signaling is implemented over the PC5 interface for unicast communication, then direct device-to-device communication capability is improved, but security and integrity protection of the communication is worsened/insufficient

Engineering Contradiction:
Improvedirect device-to-device communication capabilityVSAvoidsecurity and integrity protection
Core Design Contradiction:
Adaptability or versatilityVSReliability

Solution Approach 1:

The security key derivation is segmented into two distinct processes: one for user plane (U-plane) communication and another for control plane (C-plane) communication. This segmentation allows each plane to have dedicated security keys derived from appropriate inputs, ensuring that security requirements specific to each communication type are met while enabling direct PC5 interface communication.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #1Segmentation

Solution Approach 2:

Security keys are derived and established before actual RRC signaling communication occurs over the PC5 interface. The WTRU derives security keys from security information exchanged during the connection setup phase, ensuring that integrity protection and encryption mechanisms are already in place before sensitive communication begins, thus preventing security vulnerabilities.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #10Preliminary action

2Reliability

If security keys are derived for both user plane and control plane communication, then comprehensive security coverage is improved, but processing complexity and key management overhead is worsened

Engineering Contradiction:
Improvecomprehensive security coverageVSAvoidprocessing complexity and key management overhead
Core Design Contradiction:
ReliabilityVSDevice complexity

Solution Approach 1:

Different security key derivation methods are applied locally to different communication planes based on their specific security requirements. The user plane uses security keys derived from PC5 interface security information, while the control plane uses keys derived from RRC layer security information. This localized approach ensures each plane receives appropriate security protection without imposing unnecessary complexity on the other plane.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #3Local quality

Solution Approach 2:

The security key derivation process changes parameters based on the communication plane type. For U-plane, keys are derived from PC5 security context including security capability information and nonces exchanged directly between WTRUs. For C-plane, keys are derived from RRC security context. This parameter adaptation allows comprehensive security coverage while managing complexity through context-aware key derivation.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #35Parameter changes

Data Source

PatentUS20260082215A1Methods, apparatus and systems for secured radio resource control (RRC) signaling over a PC5 interface for unicast communication
Publication Date: 2026.03.19 INTERDIGITAL PATENT HOLDINGS INC
  • US20260082215A1 patent drawing
  • US20260082215A1 patent drawing
  • US20260082215A1 patent drawing

AI summary

Method, apparatus and systems are disclosed that may be implemented in a Wireless Transmit/Receive Unit (WTRU) for unicast communication with another WTRU. The method may include sending, by the WTRU to the other WTRU via a PC5 interface, a communication request indicating first security information for the WTRU and receiving, by the WTRU from the other WTRU via the PC5 interface, information which is integrity protected indicating second security information for the other WTRU. The method may also include deriving, by the WTRU from the indicated second security information, a first set of security keys for communication via a first layer using the U-plane and a second set of security keys for communication via a second layer using the C-plane; and sending, by the WTRU to the other WTRU via the PC5 interface, a message that is at least integrity protected using the derived first set of keys.