Peer Trust Degradation Negotiation via MAC in Centralized Networks

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Solution Overview

Problem

In systems where multiple client entities rely on a central entity for communication, a compromise or spoofing of the central entity can significantly impact the entire infrastructure, as existing technologies lack effective mechanisms for peers to independently assess and respond to trust degradation of the central entity.

Innovation Solution

Peers are provisioned with secure keys and a predetermined communication plan, enabling them to detect deviations from expected behavior and negotiate trust degradation by generating notification messages with message authentication codes, allowing them to communicate securely even when the central entity is compromised.

Engineering Contradictions & Design Principles

VSEngineering Contradiction Analysis

1Ease of operation

If peers rely on a central entity for communication management, then communication coordination is simplified, but system vulnerability to central entity compromise increases

Engineering Contradiction:
Improvecommunication coordinationVSAvoidsystem security
Core Design Contradiction:
Ease of operationVSReliability

Solution Approach 1:

The patent segments the trust relationship by giving each peer independent authentication capabilities through provisioned keys and communication plans. Instead of relying entirely on the central entity for trust management, each peer can independently verify message authenticity and detect deviations, thereby reducing system vulnerability while maintaining coordinated communication through the central entity.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #1Segmentation

2Reliability

If peers have independent trust assessment capabilities, then system resilience improves, but device complexity increases

Engineering Contradiction:
Improvesystem resilienceVSAvoidpeer device complexity
Core Design Contradiction:
ReliabilityVSDevice complexity

Solution Approach 1:

The patent applies preliminary action by provisioning peers with keys and communication plans during manufacturing or initial setup. This pre-configuration enables independent trust assessment without requiring complex runtime decision-making logic. The peers simply compare observed communication patterns against their predetermined communication plans, achieving resilience through simple rule-based verification rather than complex algorithms.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #10Preliminary action

3Reliability

If peers use secure authentication mechanisms, then message integrity is protected, but computational overhead increases

Engineering Contradiction:
Improvemessage integrityVSAvoidcomputational energy
Core Design Contradiction:
ReliabilityVSUse of energy by moving object

Solution Approach 1:

The patent uses message authentication codes (MACs) as simplified copies of cryptographic verification. Instead of requiring full public key infrastructure or complex cryptographic protocols, each peer generates and verifies compact MACs using provisioned keys. This copying approach provides strong message integrity protection with minimal computational overhead, as MAC verification is much less resource-intensive than full cryptographic authentication.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #26Copying

Data Source

PatentUS10666649B2Negotiating trust degradation for a central entity by peers lacking direct communication with one another
Publication Date: 2020.05.26 INTEL CORP
  • US10666649B2 patent drawing
  • US10666649B2 patent drawing
  • US10666649B2 patent drawing

AI summary

Systems, apparatuses and methods may provide for generating, in response to a decrease in trustworthiness with respect to a controller, a notification message and generating a message authentication code (MAC) based on the notification message and one or more locally stored keys. Additionally, the notification message and the MAC may be sent to the controller, wherein the notification message is directed to one or more peers in a network associated with the controller. In one example, the notification message includes one or more of an indication that the controller is compromised or an indication that the controller is suspected to be compromised.