Phase Manipulation Attack Protection in AoA and AoD Systems
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Solution Overview
Problem
Existing Angle of Arrival (AoA) and Angle of Departure (AoD) algorithms are vulnerable to phase manipulation attacks, which can disrupt location systems used in access control, security, and tracking applications by misleading the location of devices, potentially causing health or financial issues.
Innovation Solution
The system generates a random antenna switching pattern to detect malicious phase manipulation by comparing phase differences in the Constant Tone Extension (CTE) signal received during AoA or AoD operations, and takes actions such as discarding location data or alerting operators if significant phase discrepancies are detected.
Engineering Contradictions & Design Principles
Engineering Contradiction Analysis
1Measurement precision
If AoA/AoD algorithms use phase difference measurement to determine signal direction, then location accuracy is improved, but the system becomes vulnerable to phase manipulation attacks
Solution Approach 1:
The system performs preliminary actions by generating random antenna switching patterns before signal reception and comparing received signal phases against expected phases derived from these patterns. This preliminary setup creates a verification mechanism that detects phase manipulation attacks before they can compromise location accuracy, thus maintaining both measurement precision and reliability
2Device complexity
If the system assumes continuous non-varying incoming signals for phase difference calculation, then algorithm simplicity is improved, but detection capability against malicious signals is reduced
Solution Approach 1:
The patent introduces an intermediary verification mechanism using random antenna switching patterns and phase comparison. This intermediary layer sits between the simple phase difference calculation and the final location determination, adding detection capability without significantly complicating the core algorithm. The switching pattern acts as a mediator that enables malicious signal detection while preserving algorithm simplicity
Data Source
AI summary
Systems and methods for detecting and protecting against phase manipulation during AoA or AoD operations are disclosed. For AoA operations, the network device receiving the constant tone extension (CTE) generates an antenna switching pattern, which may be randomly generated. The network device then receives the CTE using a plurality of antenna elements. In one embodiment, the network device compares the phase of portions of the CTE signal received that utilize the same antenna element. If the phase of these portions differs by more than a threshold, the network device detects a malicious attack and acts accordingly. In another embodiment, if the AoA algorithm cannot determine the angle of arrival, the network device detects a malicious attack and acts accordingly. For angle of departure operations, the network device that transmits the CTE signal generates the antenna switching pattern and transmits it to the position engine, which performs the comparisons described above.