Physical Medium Securing Asymmetric Cryptographic Keys
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Solution Overview
Problem
Existing methods for securely storing cryptographic keys are vulnerable to malicious attacks and natural disasters, and they do not provide reliable long-term storage solutions, as they often require trust in third-party service providers and are susceptible to degradation over time.
Innovation Solution
A method and system for securely inscribing and storing cryptographic keys on a physical medium using tamper-evident concealing elements, where multiple management entities generate and engrave asymmetric key pairs, with each entity affixing a tamper-evident holographic sticker to conceal their private key, ensuring that only the owner can access the complete cryptographic key by removing the stickers.
Engineering Contradictions & Design Principles
Engineering Contradiction Analysis
1Reliability
If cryptographic keys are stored on digital media or with third-party service providers, then access and management is convenient, but security is compromised due to vulnerability to malicious attacks and lack of trust
Solution Approach 1:
The patent extracts the cryptographic key from digital storage and third-party custody, placing it physically on a tangible medium that the user directly controls. The key is engraved on a physical object rather than stored electronically, removing it from vulnerable digital environments and untrusted third-party systems.
Solution Approach 2:
The patent introduces a physical medium as an intermediary between the user and the cryptographic key. This medium acts as a trusted mediator that the user can securely possess and control, eliminating the need to trust third-party service providers while maintaining secure access to the key.
2Reliability
If cryptographic keys are stored on physical media, then long-term storage and security are improved, but the media is susceptible to degradation from natural disasters and physical damage
Solution Approach 1:
The patent uses a composite structure combining a physical medium (such as metal or durable material) with cryptographic key data engraved on it. This composite approach creates a storage solution that leverages the durability of the physical material while maintaining the security and permanence of the engraved information, resisting degradation from environmental factors.
3Reliability
If multiple management entities are involved in key generation, then trust requirements are minimized through distributed control, but device complexity increases
Solution Approach 1:
The patent segments the key generation process across multiple independent management entities, with each entity contributing a portion of the cryptographic key to the final composite key. This segmentation distributes control and trust requirements while the physical medium consolidates the fragmented key components into a single secure location.
Data Source
AI summary
The present invention relates to a method and a system for inscribing and securely storing cryptographic keys on a physical medium, and to a corresponding physical medium, comprising the following steps:from a first management entity (31), generating (1) a first pair of asymmetric cryptographic keys comprising a first user public key (pub1) and a first user private key (priv1), inscribing (2) the first user private key (priv1) onto a physical medium, and affixing (4) a first tamper-evident concealing element (hol1) to the physical medium in order to conceal the first user private key (priv1) and seal same, said first user private key (priv1) being accessible only by visibly breaking said first tamper-evident concealing element (hol1);from the second management entity (32), generating (6) a second pair of asymmetric cryptographic keys comprising a second user public key (pub2) and a second user private key (priv2),inscribing (7) the second user private key (priv2) onto the physical medium and affixing (9) a second tamper-evident concealing element (hol2) to the physical medium in order to conceal the second user private key (priv2) and seal same, said second user private key (priv2) being accessible only by visibly breaking said second tamper-evident concealing element (hol2);generating (10) at least one last user public key (pub0) and/or at least one cryptographic address (adr, adr-mult) from the first user public key (pub1) and the second user public key (pub2),inscribing (11) said at least one last public user key (pub0) and/or said at least one cryptographic address (adr, adr-mult) onto the physical medium, and verifying (12, 13) same, andfinally recovering the private keys (priv1, priv2) comprising the generation of a last user private key (priv0) corresponding to the last user public key (pub0) and/or to said at least one cryptographic address (adr, adr-mult).