Passive Keyless Entry Timing Checks for Relay and Replay Detection
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Solution Overview
Problem
Passive keyless entry systems are vulnerable to relay and replay attacks, which compromise vehicle security by allowing unauthorized access and control.
Innovation Solution
Implementing a method and apparatus that utilize hash values and timestamp comparisons to distinguish between legitimate and relay/replay signals, incorporating a processor and memory to generate and verify timestamps and hash values to detect anomalies.
Engineering Contradictions & Design Principles
Engineering Contradiction Analysis
1Reliability
If the PKE system uses standard authentication protocols without additional verification mechanisms, then the system maintains simplicity and ease of operation, but the system becomes vulnerable to relay attacks and replay attacks
Solution Approach 1:
The system performs preliminary actions by generating and transmitting a challenge signal containing a random number and timestamp before the actual authentication. The smart key must process this challenge and return a response with calculated hash values and timing information. This preliminary challenge-response mechanism prevents replay attacks because each authentication attempt uses a unique random challenge, and prevents relay attacks by establishing a time-bound verification framework.
Solution Approach 2:
The system changes parameters by introducing timestamp values and hash calculations into the authentication protocol. The challenge signal includes a random number and timestamp, and the response signal includes hash values derived from these parameters along with a response timestamp. This parameter transformation ensures that each authentication exchange is unique and time-bound, preventing both relay and replay attacks while maintaining protocol structure.
2Reliability
If the system implements timestamp verification and hash value comparison to detect relay attacks, then the system can distinguish malicious signals, but the processing time and computational requirements increase
Solution Approach 1:
The system applies partial verification by focusing on critical timing parameters rather than analyzing the entire signal exchange. It calculates the time difference between the challenge timestamp and response timestamp, and compares hash values only when this time difference exceeds a threshold. This selective verification approach provides sufficient security against relay attacks while minimizing unnecessary processing time for legitimate fast responses.
Solution Approach 2:
The system uses hash values as an intermediary mechanism to verify signal authenticity without requiring complex real-time analysis. The smart key generates hash values from the challenge parameters, and the PKE system verifies these hashes against expected values. This intermediary hashing process simplifies the verification logic and reduces processing time while maintaining high accuracy in detecting relay and replay attacks.
3Ease of operation
If the PKE system accepts response signals without verifying timing characteristics, then the system operates quickly and maintains user convenience, but the system cannot detect relay attacks that introduce time delays
Solution Approach 1:
The system implements feedback by continuously monitoring the timing characteristics of the authentication exchange. It calculates the time difference between challenge issuance and response receipt, and uses this feedback to determine whether to accept or reject the authentication. This feedback mechanism allows the system to maintain user convenience for legitimate fast responses while automatically detecting and rejecting relay attacks that introduce abnormal time delays, thus eliminating the need for users to be aware of security operations.
Data Source
AI summary
A method of operating a passive keyless entry (PKE) system of a vehicle can include generating and transmitting to a smart key, a first signal including a first random number and a first timestamp value, receiving from the smart key, a second signal including a second hash value and a second timestamp value, generating a third timestamp value, comparing a first difference between the second timestamp value and the first timestamp value with a first threshold for determining whether a relay signal has occurred, comparing a second difference between the third timestamp value and the second timestamp value with a second threshold for determining whether a relay signal and/or a replay signal has occurred, and comparing a first hash value based on the first timestamp value with the second hash value to determine whether to allow access to and start up of the vehicle.