Platform Services Enclave Virtualization Context Attestation
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Solution Overview
Problem
Current computing systems face challenges in securely differentiating between legitimate and malicious virtualization contexts within secure enclaves, particularly in preventing attacks from rogue enclaves or malicious processes, without expanding the trusted code base to include pre-boot firmware, VM, or VMM components.
Innovation Solution
A system that employs a platform services enclave (PSE) to receive attestation reports from application enclaves, enforcing a container-enclave policy based on the virtualization context, using secure enclave support like Intel Software Guard Extensions (SGX) to protect code and data, and maintaining a virtualization context table to control access and enforce policies.
Engineering Contradictions & Design Principles
Engineering Contradiction Analysis
1Reliability
If secure enclave support is used to protect code and data, then security and confidentiality are improved, but the ability to differentiate between legitimate and malicious virtualization contexts is worsened
Solution Approach 1:
The patent introduces an intermediary mechanism (the processor's virtualization context detection capability) that acts as a mediator between the secure enclave and the virtualization layer. This intermediary detects and reports the virtualization context (whether the enclave is running in a VM or directly on hardware) without requiring the enclave itself to have virtualization awareness, thus resolving the contradiction by adding context differentiation capability without expanding the trusted code base.
Solution Approach 2:
The patent segments the security function into two independent parts: (1) the secure enclave for protecting code and data, and (2) the processor-based virtualization context detection for identifying the execution environment. This segmentation allows each component to focus on its specific function without requiring the enclave to understand virtualization contexts, thereby maintaining security while enabling context differentiation.
2Reliability
If the trusted code base is expanded to include pre-boot firmware, VM, or VMM components, then the ability to detect malicious enclaves is improved, but device complexity and security assumptions are worsened
Solution Approach 1:
The patent extracts the virtualization context detection capability from the trusted code base and relocates it to the processor's hardware/software layer. By taking out this detection function from the enclave and VMM layers and placing it at the processor level, the system can detect whether an enclave is running in a VM or directly on hardware without requiring the enclave or VMM to be part of the trusted code base, thus reducing complexity while maintaining detection capability.
3Reliability
If secure enclaves execute in user mode without virtualization awareness, then security and isolation are improved, but the ability to enforce policies based on virtualization context is worsened
Solution Approach 1:
The patent implements a feedback mechanism where the processor detects the virtualization context and provides this information back to the policy enforcement layer. This feedback loop allows the system to enforce policies based on whether the enclave is running in a VM or directly on hardware, while the enclave itself remains unaware of and unaffected by this virtualization context, thus maintaining isolation while enabling adaptable policy enforcement.
Data Source
AI summary
Technologies for hybrid virtualization and secure enclave include a computing device and an edge orchestrator. The edge orchestrator securely provisions a container-enclave policy to the computing device. A VMM of the computing device constructs a platform services enclave that includes the container-enclave policy. The platform services enclave requests a local attestation report from an application enclave, and the application enclave generates the attestation report using secure enclave support of a compute engine of the computing device. The attestation report is indicative of a virtualization context of the application enclave, and may include a VM flag, a VMM flag, and a source address of the application enclave. The platform services enclave enforces the container-enclave policy based on the virtualization context of the application enclave. The platform services enclave may control access to functions of the computing device based on the virtualization context. Other embodiments are described and claimed.