Policy-Class Encryption Authentication Without Certificate Chains
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Solution Overview
Problem
Conventional cryptographic systems rely on hierarchical structures that require implicit trust in software and certificate authorities, which can be compromised by malicious actors, and involve resource-intensive prime number generation.
Innovation Solution
A system that generates trust anchors based on context awareness and decision procedures, eliminating the need for certificate authorities and hierarchical structures, using unique single user profiles and matrix operations to encrypt and decrypt data without relying on digital signatures or asymmetric encryption.
Engineering Contradictions & Design Principles
Engineering Contradiction Analysis
1Reliability
If hierarchical cryptographic structures with certificate authorities are used, then trust validation is established, but security reliability deteriorates due to potential compromise of trust anchors and implicit trust requirements
Solution Approach 1:
The patent extracts and eliminates the hierarchical cryptographic structure including certificate authorities, trust anchors, and digital signature requirements. By removing these external trust validation components, the system achieves security without relying on potentially compromised hierarchical structures, directly resolving the contradiction between trust validation and security reliability.
Solution Approach 2:
The system implements self-service cryptography where each device independently generates and manages its own cryptographic keys and trust validation without external certificate authorities. This self-contained approach eliminates the need for implicit trust in external entities while maintaining security, addressing both the reliability and complexity concerns.
2Reliability
If conventional asymmetric encryption with digital signatures is used, then authentication is provided, but computational resource usage increases due to large prime number generation
Solution Approach 1:
The patent employs lightweight, ephemeral cryptographic objects such as short-lived session keys and simplified signature schemes that require minimal computational resources to generate and process. These disposable cryptographic elements provide authentication without the heavy computational burden of conventional asymmetric encryption and large prime number generation.
Solution Approach 2:
The system changes the cryptographic parameters by using smaller key sizes, simplified mathematical operations, and optimized algorithms that maintain authentication reliability while significantly reducing computational resource requirements. This parameter optimization directly addresses the energy consumption issue.
3Reliability
If trust anchors and certificate chains are used, then cryptographic validation is established, but vulnerability to malicious modification increases
Solution Approach 1:
The patent implements preliminary anti-action by pre-establishing cryptographic bindings between device identities and their public keys through secure enrollment processes, and by incorporating integrity protection mechanisms that prevent unauthorized modifications. This proactive approach counters malicious modification attempts before they can compromise the validation process.
Solution Approach 2:
The system incorporates redundant cryptographic verification layers and fallback validation mechanisms that provide a cushion against potential attacks. Multiple independent verification paths ensure that if one validation mechanism is compromised, others remain intact to maintain security, addressing the vulnerability concern.
Data Source
AI summary
A computer-implemented method for satisfying gateway proofs and an integrity check to retrieve decryption value sets for a ciphertext received by a recipient computing device may include performing four gateway proofs of determining whether: (1) a group policy of the ciphertext's header matches a group policy of the recipient computing device; (2) a USUP of the header matches a USUP of the recipient computing device; (3) a first unique identifier from a ciphertext policy of the header matches a unique identifier of the recipient computing device; and (4) a second unique identifier from the ciphertext policy of the header matches the ciphertext's length. An integrity check may be performed and the recipient computing device can retrieve the decryption value sets if the gateway proofs and integrity check are satisfied.


