Post-Quantum Signing State Synchronization
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Solution Overview
Problem
Existing public-key digital signature algorithms like RSA and ECDSA are not secure against brute-force attacks from quantum computers, necessitating the development of post-quantum signature schemes that can withstand such threats.
Innovation Solution
The implementation of hash-based signature schemes, such as the Extended Merkle Signature Scheme (XMSS) and Leighton/Micali Signature (LMS), which utilize one-time signature schemes and secure hash algorithms like SHA2-256, along with Merkle trees for robust state synchronization and single-use private key guarantees to prevent forgery attacks.
Engineering Contradictions & Design Principles
Engineering Contradiction Analysis
1Reliability
If existing public-key digital signature algorithms (RSA, ECDSA) are used, then current security standards are maintained, but security against quantum computer attacks is compromised
Solution Approach 1:
The patent transitions from classical public-key algorithms (RSA, ECDSA) to post-quantum algorithms (hash-based signatures like XMSS, LMS) by changing the cryptographic parameter foundation. This involves switching from mathematical problems based on factorization and discrete logarithms to problems based on hash function properties and Merkle tree structures, thereby achieving quantum resistance while managing algorithmic complexity through standardized implementations.
2Reliability
If hash-based signature schemes are implemented, then quantum security is achieved, but state synchronization complexity increases
Solution Approach 1:
The patent segments the signature scheme into distinct stateful and stateless components. The stateful elements (counter management, seed tracking) are separated from the core signing operation, allowing independent optimization and synchronization strategies. This segmentation enables the use of standardized state synchronization protocols while maintaining quantum security through hash-based signatures.
Solution Approach 2:
The patent introduces state synchronization mechanisms as intermediary layers between multiple signing instances. These intermediaries manage the exchange and verification of state information (counters, seeds) between distributed signing devices, reducing direct complexity by providing standardized mediation protocols for state coordination without compromising the underlying quantum security of the hash-based signatures.
3Reliability
If one-time signature schemes are used, then forgery prevention is improved, but key management complexity increases
Solution Approach 1:
The patent implements preliminary key generation and state initialization before actual signing operations. Seeds and counters are pre-generated and securely stored, with their usage tracked through synchronization protocols. This preliminary action ensures that when signing occurs, the one-time nature of keys is guaranteed without requiring complex real-time key management during the signing process itself, thus maintaining strong forgery prevention while reducing operational complexity.
Data Source
AI summary
An apparatus comprises a plurality of hardware security modules, at least a first hardware security module in the plurality of hardware security modules comprising processing circuitry to generate a first plurality of pairs of cryptographic key pairs comprising a first plurality of private keys and a first plurality of public keys, forward the first plurality of public keys to a remote computing device, receive, from the remote computing device, a first plurality of ciphertexts, wherein each ciphertext in the plurality of ciphertexts represents an encryption of a cryptographic seed with a public key selected from the plurality of public keys, receive, from a subset of hardware security modules in the plurality of hardware security modules, a subset of private keys.


