Privacy Computing Unit for Secure Cross-Institutional Data Verification
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Solution Overview
Problem
Institutions face challenges in sharing user verification data securely and trustworthyly, particularly in anti-money laundering scenarios where financial institutions need KYC verification results but lack direct access to user basic data, due to privacy protection regulations.
Innovation Solution
An information sharing method and apparatus utilizing a privacy computing unit that performs matching verification on user basic data from a second institution and trustworthy third institution, ensuring encrypted data transmission and authentic verification results are shared with the first institution without exposing user data.
Engineering Contradictions & Design Principles
Engineering Contradiction Analysis
1Reliability
If institutions share user verification data directly, then verification accuracy and trustworthiness improve, but user data privacy and security are compromised
Solution Approach 1:
A privacy computing unit is introduced as an intermediary between institutions. The unit receives encrypted user data from multiple institutions, performs verification computations without decrypting the data, and returns verification results. This mediator enables cross-institutional verification while maintaining data encryption and privacy protection throughout the process.
Solution Approach 2:
The verification process is segmented into separate functional components: data submission by institutions, encrypted data transmission to the privacy computing unit, verification computation by the unit, and result return. This segmentation allows each institution to contribute data without having access to other institutions' data or the verification logic of others, ensuring both accuracy and privacy.
2Measurement precision
If institutions obtain user basic data from multiple sources, then verification accuracy improves, but data transmission security risks increase
Solution Approach 1:
The data is transformed from plaintext to encrypted form before transmission. The privacy computing unit operates on encrypted data using homomorphic encryption or secure multi-party computation techniques, allowing verification computations to be performed on ciphertext without decryption. This parameter change from plaintext to encrypted state maintains verification accuracy while eliminating transmission leakage risks.
3Reliability
If financial institutions access user KYC data directly, then regulatory compliance improves, but data access control and privacy protection deteriorate
Solution Approach 1:
The privacy computing unit serves as a controlled intermediary that financial institutions interact with through standardized interfaces. Institutions can obtain verification results needed for regulatory compliance without directly accessing user data or other institutions' data systems. The intermediary maintains strict access control while enabling compliant operations.
Solution Approach 2:
Instead of giving institutions direct access to original user data, the system provides copies in the form of verification results. These results contain the necessary information for regulatory compliance (e.g., verification pass/fail status) without exposing the underlying sensitive user data, thus maintaining access control while enabling compliance.
Data Source
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AI summary
Embodiments of the present specification disclose an information sharing method, apparatus, and device. The solution can include: After obtaining a user verification result acquisition request sent by a first institution, a privacy computing unit can determine a verification result of a user requested by the user verification result acquisition request, and feed back the verification result of the user to the first institution. The verification result of the user is obtained by performing matching verification on first data and second data of the user; the first data is user basic data obtained by decrypting first encrypted data of the user that is sent by a second institution; the second data is user basic data obtained by decrypting second encrypted data of the user that is sent by a third institution; and the third institution is a trustworthy institution.