Private Key Protection via Multi-Storage Synchronization
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Solution Overview
Problem
Existing RSA private key protection methods are vulnerable to attacks, allowing attackers to infer or steal the private key by tampering with security information during the signature generation process, as current anti-attacking mechanisms can only detect but not prevent such attacks.
Innovation Solution
The method employs multiple storage areas to store security information, where one area is used for current operations and updated synchronously across others, and another area is selected if the current one is under attack, ensuring the provision of correct information and updating it, thereby preventing attackers from inferring the private key.
Engineering Contradictions & Design Principles
Engineering Contradiction Analysis
1Reliability
If a single storage area is used to store security information, then the device complexity is low, but the reliability is poor because attackers can steal the private key by tampering with security information during signature generation
Solution Approach 1:
The patent divides the storage of security information into multiple storage areas (first storage area and second storage area) instead of using a single storage area. This segmentation allows the system to switch between different storage areas during signature generation, preventing attackers from successfully tampering with security information in a single location and thereby improving private key security.
2Reliability
If multiple storage areas are used to store security information, then the reliability improves, but the device complexity increases
Solution Approach 1:
The patent implements a dynamic selection mechanism where the system switches between a first storage area and a second storage area based on the operation phase. During signature generation, the system alternates between these storage areas, making it difficult for attackers to predict and tamper with security information. This dynamic approach manages the complexity of multiple storage areas through structured phase-based switching.
Solution Approach 2:
The patent pre-establishes multiple storage areas (first and second storage areas) before the signature generation process begins. This preliminary preparation allows the system to immediately switch between storage areas during signature generation without adding runtime complexity, thereby improving reliability while keeping the management structure organized and predictable.
3Reliability
If security information is updated frequently, then the reliability improves by preventing attacks, but the productivity decreases due to additional update operations
Solution Approach 1:
The patent updates security information periodically by switching between the first and second storage areas in a regular pattern during signature generation. This periodic switching ensures that even if an attacker manages to tamper with security information in one storage area, the system will have already switched to another storage area by the next update cycle, maintaining reliability while keeping the update operations structured and efficient.
Data Source
AI summary
An anti-attacking method for a private key is provided. The method includes using a plurality of storage areas for storing the same security information. The method also includes selecting one of the storage areas as a currently-used storage area for accessing the security information and synchronously updating the security information stored in the other storage areas while updating the security information stored in the currently-used used storage area when generating a digital signature by using a signature rule and the private key. The method further includes selecting one of the other storage areas as the currently-used storage area for correctly accessing the security information when detecting an attack on the security information stored in the currently-used storage area during generation of the digital signature. Therefore, it is possible to prevent the attacker from stealing the private key.