Process Component Instantiation Security via Agent Validation

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Solution Overview

Problem

Current computer devices face security vulnerabilities due to the assignment of privileges to process components, which can be exploited by malicious attackers, even when implementing a least-privilege access security model, as these privileges are inherited and can lead to unauthorized access and potential security breaches.

Innovation Solution

A computer device and method that intercepts requests to instantiate new process components, validates relationships between the new and existing process components, and establishes a set of identified owners to determine if trusted owners are involved, inserting identifiers into the new process components to enhance security and control their instantiation, thereby reducing the risk of untrusted components exploiting default user privileges.

Engineering Contradictions & Design Principles

VSEngineering Contradiction Analysis

1Ease of operation

If process components are assigned privileges upon instantiation according to user account or inheritance from parent process, then user convenience and process functionality are improved, but security vulnerabilities increase as malicious attackers can exploit these assigned privileges

Engineering Contradiction:
Improveuser convenienceVSAvoidsecurity vulnerabilities
Core Design Contradiction:
Ease of operationVSObject-affected harmful factors

Solution Approach 1:

The patent introduces an intermediary mechanism (the agent and privilege access management service) that sits between the process instantiation request and the privilege assignment. This intermediary validates the relationship between the new process component and its parent process, checks for trusted owner identifiers, and only then permits privilege inheritance. This resolves the contradiction by maintaining ease of operation for legitimate processes while blocking security vulnerabilities from malicious processes.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #24Intermediary (Mediator)

Solution Approach 2:

The patent applies preliminary action by inserting trusted owner identifiers into process components before they can exploit privileges. The system proactively validates relationships and establishes trusted ownership status prior to privilege assignment, preventing malicious processes from inheriting privileges. This preliminary validation step ensures that only legitimate processes can access privileged functions while maintaining normal operation for trusted processes.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #10Preliminary action

2Object-affected harmful factors

If a least-privilege access security model is implemented with temporary privileges, then security is improved by limiting access, but reliability decreases when processes need elevated privileges for legitimate operations

Engineering Contradiction:
ImprovesecurityVSAvoidprocess functionality
Core Design Contradiction:
Object-affected harmful factorsVSReliability

Solution Approach 1:

The patent applies local quality by differentiating privilege access on a per-process basis rather than applying uniform privilege restrictions. Trusted process components with validated relationships and identified owners receive elevated privileges when needed, while untrusted processes remain restricted to minimal privileges. This local differentiation maintains security for untrusted processes while ensuring reliability for legitimate operations requiring elevated access.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #3Local quality

Solution Approach 2:

The patent implements dynamics by making privilege assignment dynamic rather than static. Processes can transition between privilege states based on their trusted ownership status and validated relationships. The system dynamically evaluates privilege requests against the trusted owner database and relationship validation results, allowing legitimate processes to obtain elevated privileges temporarily when needed while maintaining least-privilege security for untrusted processes.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #15Dynamics

3Ease of operation

If process components inherit privileges from parent processes, then ease of operation is improved, but security control is worsened as untrusted components can exploit inherited privileges

Engineering Contradiction:
Improveprocess functionalityVSAvoidunauthorized access
Core Design Contradiction:
Ease of operationVSObject-affected harmful factors

Solution Approach 1:

The patent introduces an intermediary validation layer between parent process privilege assignment and child process inheritance. The agent intercepts instantiation requests, validates the parent-child relationship, checks for trusted owner identifiers in the process hierarchy, and only then permits privilege inheritance. This intermediary mechanism maintains ease of operation for legitimate processes while blocking unauthorized access from untrusted components.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #24Intermediary (Mediator)

Solution Approach 2:

The patent implements feedback by continuously monitoring process relationships and trusted owner status. The system validates relationships between processes and provides feedback on whether privilege inheritance should be permitted based on the trusted ownership chain. This feedback mechanism ensures that privilege inheritance occurs only when security conditions are met, preventing unauthorized access while maintaining normal functionality for trusted processes.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #23Feedback

Data Source

PatentUS12174938B2Computer device and method for controlling process components
Publication Date: 2024.12.24 AVECTO
  • US12174938B2 patent drawing
  • US12174938B2 patent drawing
  • US12174938B2 patent drawing

AI summary

A computer device, including at least a processor and a memory, can be configured to control process components on a computer device. An agent can intercept a request to instantiate a new process component. The request can originate on the computing device from an instance of a particular process component amongst a set of process components. The agent can determine whether to permit the intercepted request by validating the relationship using a policy with rules as well as and determining a trusted owner is among the set of identified owners. The agent can permit the intercepted if the determination is to permit the intercepted request.