Proof-of-Origin Blockchain Validator Registration
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Solution Overview
Problem
Current blockchain consensus algorithms, such as proof-of-work and proof-of-stake, face challenges in ensuring trust and fairness, with proof-of-work consuming significant energy and proof-of-stake favoring those with financial advantages, leading to potential Sybil attacks.
Innovation Solution
A method for validating new validators on a proof-of-origin blockchain involves receiving an announce message with a unique tag, peer identifier, and cryptographic signatures, verifying the authenticity of the message by checking the registered status of the authorised signer and the validity of the signatures, and accepting the new validator if the checks are positive.
Engineering Contradictions & Design Principles
Engineering Contradiction Analysis
1Reliability
If proof-of-work consensus algorithm is used, then trust and security are improved, but energy consumption increases significantly
Solution Approach 1:
The patent replaces the mechanical proof-of-work system (computational puzzles requiring significant processing power and energy) with a proof-of-origin system that uses cryptographic signatures and registered identity verification. Instead of requiring validators to perform energy-intensive work to prove their right to validate, the system uses digital signatures and registered identities to authenticate validators, thereby maintaining security while eliminating the need for high energy consumption.
2Use of energy by moving object
If proof-of-stake consensus algorithm is used, then energy consumption is reduced, but fairness deteriorates due to financial advantage concentration
Solution Approach 1:
The patent changes the fundamental parameter for validator selection from financial stake (proof-of-stake) to registered origin identity (proof-of-origin). Instead of requiring validators to lock up cryptocurrency tokens proportional to their voting power, the system requires validators to present cryptographic proof of their registered identity from a trusted origin. This transformation maintains low energy consumption while ensuring fairness, as each registered identity receives equal validation rights regardless of financial wealth.
3Adaptability or versatility
If permissionless blockchain is used, then accessibility is improved, but vulnerability to Sybil attacks increases
Solution Approach 1:
The patent introduces a trusted intermediary component - the origin verification system with registered identities - that acts as a mediator between anonymous participants and the blockchain network. Instead of allowing completely anonymous participation (which enables Sybil attacks) or requiring complex identity verification, the system uses pre-registered identities from trusted origins as an intermediary layer. This intermediary provides a reliable method to distinguish unique participants while maintaining accessibility, as anyone with a registered identity can participate without revealing personal information.
Data Source
Figure 1~3a
Figure 3b~3d
Figure 4b~5
AI summary
In validating a new validator for a proof-of-origin blockchain, an announce message is received including: a unique tag (T) uniquely identifying one fixed communication line of a subscriber of a fixed communication operator; a peer identifier (peer@) of the new validator; an identifier of an authorised signer, and a cryptographic signature (S2) of the authorised signer over at least the unique tag (T) and the peer identifier (peer@); validity of the announce message is verified, including checking from the PoO blockchain that the authorised signer is registered there as an authorised signer and checking the cryptographic signature (S2) of the authorised signer in the announce message. If each checking of the verifying is positive, then accepting the new validator for the PoO blockchain and mapping in the PoO blockchain the unique tag with at least the peer identifier, otherwise refusing the new validator.