PRS Configuration Encryption for Spoofing Defense

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Solution Overview

Problem

Current wireless communication systems are vulnerable to spoofing attacks on positioning reference signals (PRS), which can compromise the accuracy and security of user equipment (UE) positioning.

Innovation Solution

The method involves encrypting at least one parameter of the PRS configuration using a secret key, transmitting the encrypted value to the UE, and then applying the secret key to recover the original parameter value, thereby securing the PRS from spoofing attacks.

Engineering Contradictions & Design Principles

VSEngineering Contradiction Analysis

1Reliability

If PRS configuration parameters are transmitted in clear text, then the system complexity is low and ease of operation is high, but the system becomes vulnerable to spoofing attacks compromising positioning security

Engineering Contradiction:

Improvepositioning securityVSAvoidsystem complexity

Core Design Contradiction:

ReliabilityVSDevice complexity

Solution Approach 1:

The patent applies parameter changes by transforming the PRS configuration parameters from clear text to encrypted form using cryptographic algorithms. The encryption process changes the state of the parameters from readable to confidential, preventing unauthorized access and spoofing attacks while maintaining the functional integrity of the positioning system.

Inventive Principle:

Principle #35Parameter changes

Solution Approach 2:

The patent introduces cryptographic intermediaries (encryption algorithms and secret keys) as mediators between the PRS configuration parameters and the transmission channel. These intermediaries protect the parameters from direct exposure to potential attackers while allowing authorized UEs to retrieve and use the original parameters through proper decryption procedures.

Inventive Principle:

Principle #24Intermediary (Mediator)

2Reliability

If encryption is applied to PRS configuration parameters, then positioning security is improved, but the processing time and complexity increase

Engineering Contradiction:

Improvepositioning securityVSAvoidprocessing time

Core Design Contradiction:

ReliabilityVSLoss of time

Solution Approach 1:

The patent implements preliminary action by performing encryption of PRS configuration parameters in advance, before transmission to the UE. The network side completes the encryption process beforehand, so that when the UE receives the encrypted parameters, it only needs to perform decryption and retrieval operations, significantly reducing the time impact on the positioning process.

Inventive Principle:

Principle #10Preliminary action

3Reliability

If secret keys are transmitted to UEs, then authorized UEs can decrypt and use correct PRS configuration, but the risk of key compromise increases

Engineering Contradiction:

Improveauthorization controlVSAvoidkey compromise risk

Core Design Contradiction:

ReliabilityVSObject-affected harmful factors

Solution Approach 1:

The patent applies parameter changes to the key management process by transforming the key transmission from a static security model to a dynamic one. The network selectively provides secret keys to authorized UEs based on their credentials and authorization status, and the keys can be updated or revoked as needed, enhancing security while maintaining controlled access.

Inventive Principle:

Principle #35Parameter changes

Data Source

PatentUS20250031046A1Positioning reference signal (PRS) security from spoofing attacks

Publication Date: 2025.01.23 QUALCOMM INC

AI summary

Disclosed are techniques for wireless communication. In an aspect, a user equipment receives a positioning reference signal (PRS) configuration for at least one or more PRS resources, wherein at least one parameter of the PRS configuration is encrypted using at least one secret key to provide an encrypted value of the at least one parameter in the PRS configuration, receives the at least one secret key, and applies the at least one secret key to the at least one parameter to recover an original value of the at least one parameter.