Pseudonymous Remote Attestation via Chain-of-Trust
Find Innovative SolutionsGenerate Solutions
Solution Overview
Problem
Resource-constrained devices, such as wearable technology and sensors, lack the necessary resources to implement traditional security measures like Trusted Execution (TXT) to detect and prevent malware, making them vulnerable to compromise and potential infection of other devices.
Innovation Solution
The implementation of symmetric keying and chain of trust protocols allows for authentication and attestation without requiring secure co-processors or TPMs, using a verifier device to establish a shared symmetric key with a prover device, which can then derive program keys for authenticating applications and data, ensuring the integrity of software and protecting against malware.
Engineering Contradictions & Design Principles
Engineering Contradiction Analysis
1Reliability
If traditional security measures like Trusted Execution (TXT) are implemented, then security against malware is improved, but device complexity and resource requirements increase
Solution Approach 1:
The patent uses cryptographic copies (hash values) of code modules instead of the actual code modules themselves for security verification. The prover generates hash values of its code modules and provides these copies to the verifier for authentication, allowing security verification without requiring the verifier to have complex security infrastructure.
Solution Approach 2:
The patent introduces a certifier as an intermediary that issues certificates containing public keys to provers. This intermediary approach allows resource-constrained devices to benefit from security verification without requiring them to implement complex security measures themselves, as the certifier performs the heavy cryptographic verification work.
2Reliability
If asymmetric encryption keys and TPM are used for attestation, then security is improved, but resource consumption increases
Solution Approach 1:
The patent replaces resource-intensive asymmetric encryption and TPM hardware with cryptographic hash copies of code modules. The prover generates hash values (copies) of its code modules and provides these to the verifier, which then verifies authenticity using symmetric keys and certificates, dramatically reducing computational resources and energy consumption while maintaining security.
Solution Approach 2:
The patent uses disposable symmetric keys and certificates that can be generated and discarded efficiently. Instead of relying on expensive, long-lived asymmetric key pairs and TPM hardware, the system uses lightweight symmetric cryptography with certificates that can be quickly generated, used for verification, and replaced if needed, reducing overall resource consumption.
3Measurement precision
If identity information is disclosed during authentication, then verification accuracy is improved, but information security worsens
Solution Approach 1:
The patent verifies device authenticity by comparing cryptographic hash copies of code modules rather than disclosing actual identity information. The prover provides hash values (copies) of its code modules, and the verifier checks these against expected values in the certificate, achieving accurate verification without exposing sensitive identity data.
Solution Approach 2:
The patent uses asymmetric information distribution where the prover possesses private information (code modules and private keys) that it never discloses, while providing only verified copies (hash values and public keys). This asymmetric approach allows the verifier to gain confidence in the prover's identity without the prover losing any sensitive information.
Data Source
AI summary
The present application is directed to pseudonymous attestation utilizing a chain of trust. An example prover device may include a chain-of-trust based on keys derived cryptographically from a shared symmetric key and pseudonymous identification data. The chain-of-trust may be used to cryptographically generate a pseudonymous public key and private key. The prover device may provide at least pseudonymous identification data and the pseudonymous public key to a verifier device. The verifier device may access pseudonymous data published by a certifier determine whether the prover device is authentic and includes known-good versions of software (e.g., sourced from the certifier). In this manner, the verifier device may be assured that the prover device is authentic without knowing the actual identity of the prover device. In at least one embodiment, the prover device may also include a trusted execution environment (TEE).