Personal Seat License Auction With Staggered Listing End Times

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Solution Overview

Problem

Current systems for selling personal seat licenses (PSLs) lack an efficient strategy to maximize revenue while providing a engaging experience for bidders, with existing auctions often failing to dynamically adjust parameters based on demand and bidder behavior.

Innovation Solution

Implementing a multi-day PSL auction with staggered listing end times, dynamic quantity and duration adjustments, and bidder segmentation to enhance exposure and engagement, along with real-time strategy reviews to optimize auction parameters.

Engineering Contradictions & Design Principles

VSEngineering Contradiction Analysis

1Productivity

If a single-day auction format is used, then the auction process is simple to manage, but the revenue yield per PSL is lower due to limited exposure and bidder engagement

Engineering Contradiction:
Improverevenue yield per PSLVSAvoidauction management complexity
Core Design Contradiction:
ProductivityVSDevice complexity

Solution Approach 1:

The auction is divided into multiple days with staggered listing end times, creating multiple closing moments throughout the auction period. This segmentation increases exposure opportunities for bidders while allowing the system to manage complexity through structured, repeatable daily patterns rather than a single complex simultaneous auction

Inventive Principle:
Principle #1Segmentation

Solution Approach 2:

The auction system dynamically adjusts parameters such as listing end times, quantity allocations, and bid increments based on real-time demand assessment and bidder behavior. This dynamic adaptation maximizes revenue yield by responding to market conditions while the underlying multi-day structure provides a framework for managing complexity

Inventive Principle:
Principle #15Dynamics

2Productivity

If PSL listings are offered in large quantities at once, then the auction process is simpler to administer, but individual PSLs receive less exposure and bid activity is diluted

Engineering Contradiction:
Improveexposure per PSLVSAvoidlisting management complexity
Core Design Contradiction:
ProductivityVSDevice complexity

Solution Approach 1:

PSL inventory is segmented into smaller lots offered across multiple days rather than presented as one large batch. This segmentation ensures each PSL receives adequate exposure during specific time windows while the systematic approach to lot creation and scheduling keeps management complexity manageable

Inventive Principle:
Principle #1Segmentation

Solution Approach 2:

The auction employs periodic action by offering new PSL listings at regular intervals throughout the auction period, with fresh listings introduced at the start of each new day. This periodic presentation maintains high exposure levels for individual PSLs while the rhythmic pattern simplifies administrative management compared to continuous or irregular offering schedules

Inventive Principle:
Principle #19Periodic action

3Ease of operation

If all PSL listings close at the same time, then the auction is easier to coordinate, but bidder engagement decreases and repeat bidding opportunities are lost

Engineering Contradiction:
Improveauction coordinationVSAvoidbidder engagement
Core Design Contradiction:
Ease of operationVSProductivity

Solution Approach 1:

The auction coordinates multiple closing times segmented throughout the day rather than a single unified closing. This segmentation maintains ease of operation through structured, predictable closing schedules while dramatically increasing bidder engagement by creating multiple decision points and extending the auction lifecycle

Inventive Principle:
Principle #1Segmentation

Solution Approach 2:

The staggered closing times create continuity of useful action by ensuring listings are continuously closing throughout the auction period rather than having a single discontinuous closing moment. This continuous activity sustains bidder engagement while the systematic scheduling pattern keeps coordination manageable

Inventive Principle:
Principle #20Continuity of useful action

4Adaptability or versatility

If the auction strategy is fixed from the outset, then planning is simpler, but the system cannot adapt to changing demand patterns and bidder behavior

Engineering Contradiction:
Improvestrategy adaptabilityVSAvoidauction system complexity
Core Design Contradiction:
Adaptability or versatilityVSDevice complexity

Solution Approach 1:

The auction system incorporates feedback mechanisms that assess demand patterns and bidder behavior during the auction, using this information to dynamically adjust quantities, durations, and other parameters. This feedback loop enables strategy adaptability while the structured framework for implementing adjustments keeps system complexity manageable

Inventive Principle:
Principle #23Feedback

Solution Approach 2:

The auction strategy transitions from a static fixed plan to a dynamic system that adapts in real-time based on observed market conditions. This dynamics approach enhances adaptability while the underlying multi-day structure and standardized adjustment protocols prevent complexity from becoming unmanageable

Inventive Principle:
Principle #15Dynamics

Data Source

PatentUS8326696B2System and methods for a personal seat license auction
Publication Date: 2012.12.04 STUBHUB INC
  • US8326696B2 patent drawing
  • US8326696B2 patent drawing
  • US8326696B2 patent drawing

AI summary

A system and methods for a personal seat license (PSL) auction are described. The PSL auction is designed to maximize revenue while providing bidders with a fun and engaging experience. In general, the PSL auction extends over multiple days, and PSLs are auctioned in mixed quantities of small lots so that inventory gets the most exposure. The list end times for the PSL listings are staggered to provide a dynamic online marketplace where PSL listings are closing all of the time. This provides more bidders that bid on multiple lots and more chances for bidders to return if they are unsuccessful on a given day.