Public Key Validation via Seed Encryption in Quantum-Resistant Protocols

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Solution Overview

Problem

Existing key agreement protocols, especially those designed to be secure against quantum-resistant technologies, lack effective methods for validating public keys, making them vulnerable to attacks where invalid key pairs can compromise the security of encrypted communications.

Innovation Solution

A method for validating private-public key pairs involves generating a unique seed for each session, using a key derivation function to determine the private key, and employing a validation field encryption algorithm to verify the authenticity of the public key, ensuring that only valid key pairs are used for secure communication.

Engineering Contradictions & Design Principles

VSEngineering Contradiction Analysis

1Reliability

If quantum-resistant key agreement protocols are used, then security against quantum computers is improved, but the ability to validate public keys deteriorates

Engineering Contradiction:
Improvesecurity against quantum computersVSAvoidpublic key validation
Core Design Contradiction:
ReliabilityVSDifficulty of detecting and measuring

Solution Approach 1:

The patent introduces a validation field as an intermediary component that mediates between the public key and the validation process. This field contains encoded information about the public key's validity, allowing validators to verify keys without directly analyzing the cryptographic mathematics, thus solving the validation difficulty in quantum-resistant protocols

Inventive Principle:
Principle #24Intermediary (Mediator)

Solution Approach 2:

The patent performs validation field generation and encoding as a preliminary action before the actual key agreement protocol execution. By pre-computing and embedding validity information in the validation field, the system enables efficient validation later without compromising the security properties of the quantum-resistant algorithm

Inventive Principle:
Principle #10Preliminary action

2Ease of operation

If public keys are widely distributed, then ease of operation is improved, but vulnerability to invalid key pairs worsens

Engineering Contradiction:
Improvepublic key distributionVSAvoidinvalid key pair attacks
Core Design Contradiction:
Ease of operationVSObject-affected harmful factors

Solution Approach 1:

The validation field serves as an intermediary that travels with the public key during distribution. It provides embedded validity information that allows receiving parties to verify keys without requiring complex validation logic, thus maintaining ease of distribution while protecting against invalid keys

Inventive Principle:
Principle #24Intermediary (Mediator)

Solution Approach 2:

The patent applies preliminary anti-action by embedding validity constraints in the validation field before distribution. This pre-emptive measure prevents invalid key pairs from being successfully used, countering potential attacks before they can occur

Inventive Principle:
Principle #9Preliminary anti-action

Data Source

PatentUS9635003B1Method of validating a private-public key pair
Publication Date: 2017.04.25 NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY
  • US9635003B1 patent drawing
  • US9635003B1 patent drawing
  • US9635003B1 patent drawing

AI summary

A key pair validation method provides for a first party to generate a seed to define a private key, a public key, a session key and a validation field for the purpose of performing a cryptographic activity with a second party. The validation field is determined by encrypting the first party seed. The second party receives the first party public key and the validation field from the first party. The second party calculates a session key and utilizing the calculated session key, decrypts a cipher text to recover the first party's seed and the first party's private and public key. The recovered first party public key is compared to the received first party public key. If the received and recovered public keys match, the private-public key pair received from the first party is validated and the second party proceeds with the cryptographic task. If the received and recovered public keys do not match, the second party simply reports to the first party that the cryptographic task failed.