Physically Unclonable Function Circuit for Secure Identification Key Generation

Resolve Bottlenecks,
Find Innovative Solutions
Generate Solutions

Solution Overview

Problem

Existing security systems face vulnerabilities from side channel and reverse engineering attacks on identification keys stored in computing devices, necessitating a secure method to generate and store unique, unpredictable digital values.

Innovation Solution

A physically unclonable function (PUF) is implemented using semiconductor process variations to generate an identification key, where the randomness of node connections between conductive layers is determined, providing a time-invariant and highly reliable key.

Engineering Contradictions & Design Principles

VSEngineering Contradiction Analysis

1Reliability

If identification keys are stored in computing devices, then security protection is provided, but the system becomes vulnerable to side channel attacks and reverse engineering attacks

Engineering Contradiction:
Improvesecurity protectionVSAvoidvulnerability to attacks
Core Design Contradiction:
ReliabilityVSObject-affected harmful factors

Solution Approach 1:

The patent converts the harmful effect of semiconductor process variations (which cause uncertainty in electrical characteristics) into a beneficial security feature. By deliberately designing the PUF structure to exploit these variations, the manufacturing imperfections become the source of unique, unpredictable identification keys that are impossible to replicate, thus transforming a potential source of error into a security strength against attacks.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #22Blessing in disguise (Convert harm into benefit)

Solution Approach 2:

The PUF structure generates identification keys using its own inherent physical properties and manufacturing variations without requiring external secret inputs or complex key management infrastructure. The device itself serves as the security mechanism, with its unique physical characteristics automatically providing the cryptographic key, eliminating the need for separate key storage and management systems that would be vulnerable to attacks.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #25Self-service

2Reliability

If PUF is implemented using semiconductor process variation, then unique and unpredictable identification keys are generated, but the manufacturing precision is reduced

Engineering Contradiction:
Improveunpredictability of keyVSAvoidprocess variation
Core Design Contradiction:
ReliabilityVSManufacturing precision

Solution Approach 1:

The patent changes the approach from controlling manufacturing parameters to exploiting parameter variations. Instead of trying to minimize process variation through tighter manufacturing controls, the design intentionally operates in a regime where variations are maximized and harnessed. The PUF structure is designed to be highly sensitive to process parameters, converting manufacturing imprecision into the desired cryptographic entropy for unique key generation.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #35Parameter changes

Solution Approach 2:

The patent transforms the harmful effect of reduced manufacturing precision into a beneficial security feature. The process variations that would normally be considered defects or sources of yield loss are instead exploited as the fundamental source of uniqueness and unpredictability in the generated identification keys, making each device's key inherently different and impossible to predict or replicate.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #22Blessing in disguise (Convert harm into benefit)

3Reliability

If narrow vias are used between conductive layers, then randomness is increased, but the manufacturing complexity increases

Engineering Contradiction:
Improverandomness of keyVSAvoidmanufacturing complexity
Core Design Contradiction:
ReliabilityVSDevice complexity

Solution Approach 1:

The patent divides the PUF structure into multiple conductive layers separated by dielectric layers, with narrow vias connecting them. This segmentation into discrete layers and connection points creates multiple independent random variables that contribute to the overall key entropy. Each via's formation success or failure becomes an independent random bit source, and the layered structure allows these to be combined to generate the final identification key.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #1Segmentation

Solution Approach 2:

The patent moves from planar to three-dimensional structure by stacking multiple conductive layers vertically with vias providing inter-layer connections. This dimensional transition from 2D to 3D architecture increases the number of potential random events (via formation variations) without significantly increasing lateral manufacturing complexity, as the same lithography and deposition tools can be used in a sequential layered approach.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #17Another dimension (Dimensionality change)

Applied Scientific Principles

This section explains which scientific principles are used to turn an abstract innovation direction into a practical engineering solution.

Function Achieved in This Case

The solution generates a secure, unpredictable identification key that is resistant to duplication and environmental changes, ensuring high-level randomness and time-invariance, effectively protecting against attacks.

Implementation Method 1

Whether the first node and the second node are shorted may be randomly determined by a process variation occurring in the semiconductor chip

Methodology Applied
Scientific EffectSemiconductor process variation:

Data Source

PatentEP3057032B1Apparatus and method for generating identification key
Publication Date: 2023.05.31 ICTK HLDG CO
  • EP3057032B1 patent drawingFigure 1
  • EP3057032B1 patent drawingFigure 2
  • EP3057032B1 patent drawingFigure 3

AI summary

An apparatus for generating an identification key is provided. The apparatus may include a first conductive layer formed on a semiconductor chip, a second conductive layer formed on the semiconductor chip, wherein a spacing between the first conductive layer and the second conductive layer is equal to or greater than a first threshold and equal to or less than a second threshold, and a reader configured to determine whether a first node associated with the first conductive layer and a second node associated with the second conductive layer are shorted, and to provide an identification key.