Physical Unclonable Function Module for Integrated Circuit Security
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Solution Overview
Problem
Integrated circuits (ICs) are vulnerable to side channel attacks, particularly fault injection attacks, due to their reliance on simple encoding schemes with low Hamming distance, which can be exploited by attackers to manipulate data states, and even increased Hamming distance may not provide adequate protection as attackers can determine constants used across identical ICs.
Innovation Solution
The use of a physical unclonable function (PUF) module to generate unique fingerprint values based on IC fabrication properties, which are then used to create unique encoding values for each device, making it impossible for attackers to use extracted constants on other devices.
Engineering Contradictions & Design Principles
Engineering Contradiction Analysis
1Device complexity
If simple encoding schemes with low Hamming distance are used, then device complexity is reduced, but security against side channel attacks deteriorates
Solution Approach 1:
The patent applies local quality by making each IC device have unique encoding constants specific to that device, rather than using uniform constants across all devices. This is achieved through the PUF module which generates device-specific fingerprint values that are used to derive unique encoding constants for each device, thereby improving security without significantly increasing overall system complexity
Solution Approach 2:
The patent changes the parameters used for encoding from fixed, simple values to dynamic, device-specific values generated by the PUF module. The encoding constants are derived from the fingerprint value which is deterministically dependent on physical fabrication properties, thereby transforming the encoding scheme from static to adaptive while maintaining operational simplicity
2Manufacturing precision
If identical constants are used across all IC devices, then manufacturing precision is improved, but security against fault injection attacks deteriorates
Solution Approach 1:
The patent implements local quality by making encoding constants device-specific rather than uniform across all devices. Each device's PUF module generates a unique fingerprint value based on its specific physical fabrication properties, which is then used to derive unique encoding constants for that particular device, preventing attackers from using extracted constants on other devices
Solution Approach 2:
The patent applies asymmetry by introducing asymmetry in the encoding constants across different devices. Instead of symmetric, identical constants used in conventional approaches, each device has asymmetric, unique constants derived from its individual PUF characteristics, making each device behave uniquely against fault injection attacks
3Reliability
If device-specific encoding values are generated using PUF, then security against side channel attacks is improved, but device complexity increases
Solution Approach 1:
The patent applies universality by making the PUF module serve multiple functions: it generates unique device identification, derives secure encoding constants, and provides cryptographic key material. This multi-functionality reduces the need for separate security modules while achieving enhanced security against side channel and fault injection attacks
Solution Approach 2:
The patent implements self-service by having each device generate its own unique encoding constants internally through the PUF module based on its own physical characteristics. The device autonomously derives its specific encoding values without requiring external provisioning or configuration, thereby simplifying manufacturing and deployment while maintaining high security
Data Source
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AI summary
A method of encoding a variable, which may have a plurality of different states, using an integrated circuit comprising a physical unclonable function module. The method comprises using the physical unclonable function module to generate (102) a fingerprint value deterministically dependent on one or more physical fabrication properties of the integrated circuit; generating (104) a first encoding value using the fingerprint value; generating (104) a second encoding value using the fingerprint value; and encoding (106) said variable using said encoding values.