Quantum Attack Hamiltonian Construction for Key Determination

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Solution Overview

Problem

Current cryptographic protocols are vulnerable to quantum computing attacks, particularly due to the potential of Shor's algorithm for RSA cryptography and Grover's algorithm for symmetric cryptography, necessitating more efficient methods to determine encryption keys.

Innovation Solution

A method that reduces the number of qubits required for attacking cryptographic protocols by fragmenting Bloch spheres and using quantum annealing or tensor networks, applicable to both symmetric and non-symmetric protocols, to determine encryption keys by constructing a Hamiltonian based on ciphertext and adjusting quantum circuit parameters for optimal overlap.

Engineering Contradictions & Design Principles

VSEngineering Contradiction Analysis

1Reliability

If quantum computing algorithms (Shor's algorithm, Grover's algorithm) are used to attack cryptographic protocols, then the ability to decrypt ciphertext is improved, but the number of qubits required exceeds the capacity of current NISQ devices

Engineering Contradiction:
Improvecryptographic breaking capabilityVSAvoidnumber of qubits
Core Design Contradiction:
ReliabilityVSQuantity of substance

Solution Approach 1:

The patent divides the cryptographic attack problem into multiple independent sub-problems, each solvable with a smaller number of qubits. Instead of attempting to solve the entire decryption problem in one quantum circuit, the attack is segmented into multiple stages or instances that can be executed separately on current NISQ devices with limited qubit capacity.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #1Segmentation

Solution Approach 2:

The patent transitions from a direct quantum attack approach to a dimensionally different methodology. Rather than using standard quantum algorithms that require many qubits, the invention employs a hybrid classical-quantum approach where the quantum component handles specific sub-tasks in a different computational dimension, reducing the qubit requirement while maintaining attack effectiveness.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #17Another dimension (Dimensionality change)

2Adaptability or versatility

If the quantum circuit is designed to handle the full cryptographic key space, then the completeness of the attack is improved, but the circuit depth and complexity exceed NISQ device capabilities

Engineering Contradiction:
Improveattack coverageVSAvoidquantum circuit depth
Core Design Contradiction:
Adaptability or versatilityVSDevice complexity

Solution Approach 1:

The patent segments the key space exploration into multiple smaller quantum circuits or iterative steps. Each individual quantum circuit has reduced depth and complexity suitable for NISQ devices, while the collective set of segmented circuits covers the entire key space through systematic exploration or sampling.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #1Segmentation

Solution Approach 2:

The patent performs preliminary classical preprocessing to reduce the key space or identify promising key candidates before applying quantum computation. This preliminary action filters out unlikely keys, allowing the quantum circuit to focus on a smaller subset of the key space, thereby reducing circuit depth while maintaining complete attack coverage.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #10Preliminary action

3Measurement precision

If quantum algorithms are applied to symmetric cryptography, then the security analysis capability is improved, but the resource requirements (qubits, circuit depth) are not feasible on current devices

Engineering Contradiction:
Improvesecurity analysis accuracyVSAvoidquantum resource requirements
Core Design Contradiction:
Measurement precisionVSDevice complexity

Solution Approach 1:

The patent applies quantum computation partially to the security analysis problem, focusing quantum resources on the most critical or information-intensive aspects of the attack while handling other aspects classically. This partial application of quantum action achieves sufficient security analysis accuracy without requiring full quantum resource allocation that would exceed NISQ capabilities.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #16Partial or excessive action

Solution Approach 2:

The patent introduces a hybrid classical-quantum intermediary system where classical computation mediates between the quantum processor and the cryptographic analysis task. The classical component prepares inputs, processes intermediate results, and coordinates multiple quantum executions, enabling accurate security analysis with limited quantum resources by distributing the computational burden.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #24Intermediary (Mediator)

Data Source

PatentUS20240163073A1Variational Quantum Attack for Cryptographic Protocols
Publication Date: 2024.05.16 MULTIVERSE COMPUTING SL
  • US20240163073A1 patent drawing
  • US20240163073A1 patent drawing
  • US20240163073A1 patent drawing

AI summary

A method for determining an encryption key in a key space for encrypting a plain text to a corresponding encrypted ciphertext. The method comprises constructing (S220) a Hamiltonian based on the encrypted ciphertext, encoding (S230) the key space (320) into a quantum circuit (310), encrypting (S240) the plain text using the quantum circuit (310) to obtain a superposition of ciphertexts and measuring the superposition of ciphertexts to determining (S280) an overlap between the measured superposition of ciphertexts and the encrypted cyphertext. On reaching a pre-determined overlap value, the key space (320) is collapsed (S290) to determine the encryption key, or otherwise parameters of the quantum circuit (310) are adjusted.