Quantum-Resistant Key Distribution for Secure GTP Traffic
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Solution Overview
Problem
Existing mobile networks are vulnerable to quantum computing attacks, particularly targeting GTP traffic between EPC nodes, as current security measures like zone-based policy firewalls and IP security tunnels do not provide quantum resistance, leaving them exposed to threats such as message spoofing, denial-of-service attacks, and privacy invasions.
Innovation Solution
Implementing a quantum resistant key distribution method using a session key service (SKS) to generate post-quantum pre-shared keys (PQPSKs) between EPC nodes, where one node acts as a key server to distribute a shared secret seed value and PQPSK ID, ensuring both nodes have a common encryption key for securing GTP-C and GTP-U traffic.
Engineering Contradictions & Design Principles
Engineering Contradiction Analysis
1Reliability
If quantum resistant key distribution is implemented, then security against quantum computing attacks is improved, but device complexity increases
Solution Approach 1:
The patent segments the key distribution process into distinct phases: key generation at the first EPC node, key transmission to the second EPC node, and key derivation. This segmentation allows complex quantum-resistant cryptography to be broken down into manageable steps that can be implemented progressively in existing GTP protocols without overwhelming system complexity at once.
Solution Approach 2:
The patent introduces a key derivation function as an intermediary mechanism that takes the shared secret seed and generates the final encryption keys. This intermediary layer simplifies the overall system by providing a standardized way to transform the shared secret into usable cryptographic keys, reducing the complexity of direct key management between nodes.
2Use of energy by moving object
If selective encryption of critical messages is implemented, then CPU requirements are reduced, but security coverage is limited
Solution Approach 1:
The patent applies local quality by differentiating between critical and non-critical GTP messages. Encryption is selectively applied only to critical messages and information elements that require protection, rather than encrypting all traffic uniformly. This allows the system to optimize CPU resource allocation by applying computational overhead only where necessary for security.
Solution Approach 2:
The patent implements partial encryption action by securing only the most vulnerable parts of the communication (critical messages and sensitive information elements) rather than attempting to encrypt everything. This partial approach reduces the computational burden on CPU while still providing adequate security coverage for the most at-risk data.
3Reliability
If post-quantum pre-shared keys are generated and distributed, then quantum security is improved, but key management complexity increases
Solution Approach 1:
The patent performs preliminary key generation at the first EPC node before establishing communication with the second EPC node. The shared secret seed is generated and transmitted in advance, allowing the key derivation to be performed locally at each node without requiring complex real-time key exchange protocols during actual data transmission.
Solution Approach 2:
The patent transforms the key management problem by changing the parameter space from generating and managing full cryptographic keys directly to generating and sharing only a shared secret seed. This parameter change simplifies key management because the seed can be transmitted through existing GTP channels and then locally expanded into the full encryption key set at each node, reducing the complexity of key distribution.
Data Source
AI summary
Techniques and architecture are described for securing traffic between nodes of a network against quantum computing attacks. For example, a first node of a network generates a random number input string and provides the random number input string to a second node. The first node may use the random number input string to generate at least one first key and an associated identifier. The first node may forward the associated identifier to the second node. Using the random number input string, the second node may generate at least one second key. Based at least in part on the associated identifier, the second node may select the at least one second key as a common encryption key. The at least one second key and the at least one first key are identical. Based at least in part on the common encryption key, the nodes may encrypt and decrypt traffic between them.