RAN xApp Onboarding with Parameter Hardening and Token Validation

Resolve Bottlenecks,
Find Innovative Solutions
Generate Solutions

Solution Overview

Problem

The open and disaggregated nature of Radio Access Networks (RANs) exposes them to security vulnerabilities, allowing malicious entities to deploy malicious xApps that can degrade network performance, necessitating robust security measures throughout the xApp lifecycle.

Innovation Solution

Implementing a system with a hardener component to configure and modify xApp parameters according to a defined security schema, an xApp manager to control deployment, and a runtime inventory to validate xApp-node communication, ensuring secure onboarding, deployment, and communication of xApps on the RAN.

Engineering Contradictions & Design Principles

VSEngineering Contradiction Analysis

1Adaptability or versatility

If the RAN architecture is made open and disaggregated to allow multi-vendor operability and rapid innovation, then adaptability and ease of manufacture are improved, but security vulnerabilities increase allowing malicious xApps to be deployed

Engineering Contradiction:
Improvemulti-vendor operabilityVSAvoidsecurity vulnerabilities
Core Design Contradiction:
Adaptability or versatilityVSObject-affected harmful factors

Solution Approach 1:

The patent applies preliminary action by implementing a hardener component that modifies xApp parameters before deployment to a disaggregated RAN. The hardener intercepts xApps during the onboarding process and enforces secure parameter settings according to a defined schema, preventing malicious configurations from being deployed to the open RAN architecture. This proactive security measure allows the system to maintain multi-vendor operability while blocking harmful factors before they can affect the network.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #10Preliminary action

2Reliability

If xApp parameters are strictly validated against a secure schema during onboarding, then security is improved, but deployment time and processing complexity increase

Engineering Contradiction:
ImprovesecurityVSAvoiddeployment time
Core Design Contradiction:
ReliabilityVSLoss of time

Solution Approach 1:

The hardener component performs parameter validation and modification during the xApp onboarding process before deployment. By enforcing secure schema requirements in advance, the system ensures that only properly configured xApps are deployed, improving security without requiring repeated validation during operation. This preliminary enforcement of security constraints streamlines the deployment process rather than hindering it.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #10Preliminary action

Solution Approach 2:

The hardener acts as an intermediary component between the xApp developer and the disaggregated RAN deployment system. It translates security requirements into enforceable parameter constraints, mediating between the need for secure deployment and the desire for rapid innovation. The hardener automatically modifies xApp parameters to comply with the secure schema, reducing manual review time while maintaining high security standards.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #24Intermediary (Mediator)

Data Source

PatentUS20250358633A1SECURE xAPPs FOR A RADIO ACCESS NETWORK
Publication Date: 2025.11.20 DELL PROD LP
  • US20250358633A1 patent drawing
  • US20250358633A1 patent drawing
  • US20250358633A1 patent drawing

AI summary

The described technology is generally directed towards securely onboarding, deploying, and implementing an xApp on a radio access network (RAN) network. Various embodiments are presented to enable a benign xApp to be utilized on a RAN while preventing a malicious xApp from being implemented. xApp parameters can be enforced to be in accordance with parameters known to be safe/secure. An xApp can be deployed via a RAN intelligent controller (RIC) rather than directly to a control plane of the container orchestration layer. Further, token validation can be utilized to ensure a known, securely configured xApp is attempting communication with a node rather than a malicious xApp. A token can comprise known information regarding the securely configured xApp, an associated container, and a node with which the xApp is attempting to establish communications.