Reference-Signal Key Generation for Eavesdropping-Resistant Wireless Links

Resolve Bottlenecks,
Find Innovative Solutions
Generate Solutions

Solution Overview

Problem

Existing wireless communication systems face challenges in securing communications against eavesdropping, particularly in group common signals where different user equipments (UEs) have varying channel metrics, leading to potential unauthorized access and data interception.

Innovation Solution

A UE transmits a sounding reference signal using a first antenna and receives a downlink reference signal based on channel reciprocity, enabling the derivation of a security key through a value associated with the downlink signal, while the base station estimates the channel to generate a target value for the UE to derive the same key, enhancing security by masking the channel from illegitimate receivers.

Engineering Contradictions & Design Principles

VSEngineering Contradiction Analysis

1Reliability

If channel metrics are used for key derivation in wireless communications, then secure communications can be established, but illegitimate receivers can eavesdrop by perceiving the channel as fast fading or random

Engineering Contradiction:
Improvecommunication securityVSAvoideavesdropping capability
Core Design Contradiction:
ReliabilityVSObject-affected harmful factors

Solution Approach 1:

The patent segments the channel estimation process by separating legitimate channel metrics from eavesdropper observations. The base station transmits reference signals through specific antenna ports, and the UE uses only the corresponding channel metrics from those ports for key derivation, while ignoring or discarding channel information that could be exploited by eavesdroppers.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #1Segmentation

Solution Approach 2:

The patent introduces reference signals as an intermediary mechanism between the base station and UE for secure key derivation. These reference signals are transmitted through selected antenna ports and processed to generate channel metrics that serve as intermediaries for deriving security keys, preventing direct eavesdropping on the actual data transmission channel.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #24Intermediary (Mediator)

2Productivity

If multiple UEs share system resources, then communication capacity increases, but each UE has different channel metrics making it impossible to derive the same secret key

Engineering Contradiction:
Improvecommunication capacityVSAvoidkey derivation consistency
Core Design Contradiction:
ProductivityVSReliability

Solution Approach 1:

The patent applies local quality by allowing each UE to use its own channel metrics from specific antenna ports for key derivation. The base station configures different antenna port sets for different UEs, and each UE processes channel information locally from its assigned ports, enabling consistent key derivation across multiple UEs despite their different overall channel conditions.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #3Local quality

Solution Approach 2:

The patent segments the multiple antenna ports into different sets assigned to different UEs. Each UE is configured with a specific subset of antenna ports, and the base station transmits reference signals through these segmented port sets. This segmentation ensures that each UE derives keys from its own dedicated channel metrics, avoiding key derivation conflicts between multiple UEs.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #1Segmentation

Data Source

PatentUS12621661B2Channel for eavesdropping-mitigation and secret key generation
Publication Date: 2026.05.05 QUALCOMM INC
  • US12621661B2 patent drawing
  • US12621661B2 patent drawing
  • US12621661B2 patent drawing

AI summary

Methods, systems, and devices for wireless communications are described. The described techniques provide for securing communications in a wireless communications system. A base station may determine a value that one or more user equipments (UEs) are to use for deriving a secret key for use in securing communications. A UE may use a security key generation procedure to determine the value and derive the key. According to the security key generation procedure, the UE may transmit a sounding reference signal using a first antenna of a plurality of antennas configured at the UE. The UE may then select and use the first antenna for receiving a downlink reference signal in accordance with the security key generation procedure. The UE may derive a security key using a value associated with the downlink reference signal and communicate with the base station via communications that are secured using the derived security key.