Wireless Keyless Access Relay Attack Prevention

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Solution Overview

Problem

Wireless keyless access systems are vulnerable to relay attacks, where attackers intercept and replay signaling between an authorized user's access device and a secured resource, allowing unauthorized access without physical interaction or key theft.

Innovation Solution

A two-part security solution involving encryption of communications between the access device and the secured resource, and inclusion of environmental data to verify the proximity and authenticity of the access device, preventing modification or injection of false data by intermediary devices.

Engineering Contradictions & Design Principles

VSEngineering Contradiction Analysis

1Ease of operation

If wireless keyless access is implemented for convenient user operation, then ease of operation is improved, but security vulnerability to relay attacks increases

Engineering Contradiction:
Improvewireless access convenienceVSAvoidsecurity against relay attacks
Core Design Contradiction:
Ease of operationVSReliability

Solution Approach 1:

The patent introduces an intermediary challenge-response mechanism between the access device and secured resource. The system uses a relay attack detection protocol where challenges are issued and responses verified, acting as a mediator to detect and prevent relay attacks while maintaining wireless convenience.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #24Intermediary (Mediator)

Solution Approach 2:

The patent changes the parameters of communication by implementing encrypted signaling with challenge-response authentication. The system transforms simple wireless signaling into a secure protocol that includes verification challenges, making relay attacks detectable while preserving user convenience.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #35Parameter changes

2Length of stationary object

If signaling is transmitted over long distance via relay devices, then communication range is extended, but detection of direct communication becomes difficult

Engineering Contradiction:
Improvecommunication rangeVSAvoiddetection of relay attack
Core Design Contradiction:
Length of stationary objectVSDifficulty of detecting and measuring

Solution Approach 1:

The patent implements feedback through challenge-response signaling. The secured resource sends challenges that must be responded to directly by the access device, creating a feedback loop that proves direct communication. Relay devices cannot forward these challenges effectively, exposing the attack.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #23Feedback

Solution Approach 2:

The patent applies preliminary action by establishing encrypted communication channels and verification protocols before access is granted. The challenge-response mechanism is set up in advance to verify direct communication, preventing relay attacks before they can succeed.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #10Preliminary action

3Ease of operation

If access credentials are transmitted wirelessly without modification, then ease of operation is maintained, but vulnerability to credential theft increases

Engineering Contradiction:
Improvewireless access simplicityVSAvoidcredential interception risk
Core Design Contradiction:
Ease of operationVSObject-affected harmful factors

Solution Approach 1:

The patent applies preliminary anti-action by implementing encrypted signaling and challenge-response verification before credentials are transmitted. This preemptive security measure counteracts potential credential interception by relay devices, maintaining operational simplicity while blocking attacks.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #9Preliminary anti-action

Data Source

PatentUS10674365B1Systems and methods for preventing relay attacks
Publication Date: 2020.06.02 OPENPATH SECURITY INC
  • US10674365B1 patent drawing
  • US10674365B1 patent drawing
  • US10674365B1 patent drawing

AI summary

A two-part security method and system is provided to prevent unauthorized access to a secured resource via a relay attack that uses at least one intermediary device to relay signaling from an authorized access device to the secured resource despite the access device being out-of-range of the secured resource. The first part involves detecting a relay attack by encrypting signaling between the access device and the secured resource, and by detecting when the signaling is modified as a result of an intermediary device inserting data or modifying the data of the signaling exchanged between the access device and the secured resource. The second part involves detecting a relay attack based on environmental data from the access device that identifies a feature of an environment in which the access device is located, and the environmental data mapping to a location that is not within a specified location of the secured resource.