Relay UE Slice Authentication for Remote 5G Access
Find Innovative SolutionsGenerate Solutions
Solution Overview
Problem
There is no clear method for performing network slice-specific authentication and authorization (NSSAA) for remote user equipment (RM UE) accessing the network through a relay UE (RL UE) in the 5G communication standard.
Innovation Solution
A method for network slice authentication is provided, involving a first network equipment sending an authentication message with an indication and EAP message to a first UE, which forwards it to a second UE, allowing the second UE to authenticate the legality of using a target network slice through the first UE, ensuring safety and reliability of the network slice.
Engineering Contradictions & Design Principles
Engineering Contradiction Analysis
1Reliability
If network slice-specific authentication and authorization (NSSAA) flow is performed for relay UE to ensure network slice security, then authentication reliability is improved, but the complexity of the authentication process increases due to the indirect access through relay UE
Solution Approach 1:
The relay UE acts as an intermediary in the authentication process. The network equipment sends authentication information to the relay UE, which then forwards it to the remote UE. The relay UE mediates the communication between the network and the remote UE, enabling authentication without requiring direct access. This resolves the contradiction by maintaining authentication reliability while accommodating the indirect access architecture.
Solution Approach 2:
The authentication process is segmented into multiple stages: first, the network equipment generates authentication information; second, the relay UE receives and forwards this information; third, the remote UE uses the forwarded information for authentication. This segmentation allows each component to perform its specific function, reducing overall system complexity while maintaining reliability.
2Device complexity
If direct authentication method is used for remote UE accessing through relay UE, then authentication process is simplified, but network slice security cannot be ensured
Solution Approach 1:
The relay UE serves as a trusted intermediary that forwards authentication information between the network equipment and the remote UE. This intermediary approach maintains network slice security by ensuring that authentication information is properly transmitted through a controlled channel, while keeping the process relatively simple compared to direct authentication methods.
3Reliability
If clear authentication method is established for relay UE to access network slices, then network slice security is improved, but the device complexity increases due to additional authentication messages and procedures
Solution Approach 1:
The relay UE is designed to perform multiple functions: it acts as a normal UE for its own communications and simultaneously serves as a relay for remote UEs. The authentication mechanism leverages this multi-functionality by using the relay UE's existing communication channel to transmit authentication information, avoiding the need for separate dedicated authentication channels and reducing overall message complexity.
Data Source
AI summary
A network device and user equipment (UE) are provided. The network device includes a memory, a transceiver, a processor, and a bus system, the processor is configured to execute the instructions in the memory to perform operations of: in response to receiving an authentication request, sending a first authentication message to a first UE, the authentication request being used to trigger an authentication flow for a second UE requesting to use a target network slice, the second UE accessing the first network equipment through the first UE, the first authentication message comprising a first indication and a first extensible authentication protocol (EAP) message, the first indication indicating that the first EAP message is to be used by the second UE, the first EAP message being used to authenticate legality of use of the target network slice by the second UE.