Relay Usage Data Preparation for Anonymous Communication Networks
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Solution Overview
Problem
Current systems for measuring relay usage in communications networks, such as the Tor network, cannot determine the quantity of data traffic flowing through relays without compromising anonymity and require trusted third parties, which limits their effectiveness in optimizing network architecture and invoicing.
Innovation Solution
A method to compute and record usage data for relays by exchanging signature-verified frames between source and destination devices, allowing each relay to generate and record proofs of use in a shared memory, ensuring accurate measurement without revealing identities or requiring trusted intermediaries.
Engineering Contradictions & Design Principles
Engineering Contradiction Analysis
1Reliability
If cryptographic primitives are exchanged to ensure anonymity, then communication anonymity is improved, but the ability to measure relay usage is worsened
Solution Approach 1:
The system segments the measurement process into two independent parts: (1) cryptographic primitives exchange that ensures anonymity without revealing identities, and (2) usage data collection that measures relay utilization. Each relay generates usage data locally based on its own observations of traffic passing through it, rather than requiring identification of communicating parties. This segmentation allows anonymity to be preserved while still enabling precise measurement of relay usage statistics.
Solution Approach 2:
The patent introduces an intermediary mechanism in the form of usage data packets that are exchanged between relays and stored in a distributed ledger. These packets serve as mediators that carry measurement information without revealing the identities of communicating parties. The usage data acts as an intermediary representation that captures relay utilization metrics while maintaining the anonymity guarantees of the cryptographic system.
2Reliability
If trusted third parties are used to prevent fraud, then system security is improved, but system complexity is worsened
Solution Approach 1:
Each relay performs self-verification of usage data by independently generating and signing usage data packets based on its own observations. Relays use their private keys to sign usage data, creating cryptographic proofs that can be verified by the distributed network without requiring a trusted third party. This self-service approach eliminates the need for centralized authorities while maintaining fraud prevention through cryptographic verification.
Solution Approach 2:
The patent replaces the mechanical system of trusted third-party verification with a cryptographic system based on digital signatures and distributed ledger technology. Instead of relying on institutional trust, the system uses mathematical cryptography to verify usage data authenticity. Each relay's digital signature serves as an unforgeable proof of usage, substituting the need for human-mediated trust with algorithmic verification.
3Measurement precision
If relay identifiers are collected for usage measurement, then usage accuracy is improved, but communication anonymity is worsened
Solution Approach 1:
The system applies local quality by having each relay measure and report only its own local usage statistics without collecting or storing identifiers of communicating parties. Each relay generates usage data based on local observations of traffic volume and patterns passing through it, rather than attempting to identify specific communicating entities. This local measurement approach ensures accuracy in measuring relay usage while preserving the anonymity of communication participants.
Data Source
AI summary
A method for preparing usage data for a relay implemented in a computer network is disclosed. In one aspect, the network comprises at least one source device, one destination device, and at least one relay constituting a circuit to set up a communication between the source device and the destination device. The source device first of all retrieves the identifiers of the relays constituting the circuit and sends a proof of use (PoU) frame addressed to the destination device, each relay of the circuit adding to the PoU frame, at the time of passage, a signature made from a challenge and a key proper to the relay. The source device retrieves at least the signatures of each relay, and verifies the signatures received by using the public keys of the relays, the authentication of the signatures triggering the following steps: preparing, from the data received, an ordered list of identifiers of the relays used to set up the communication, sending transaction frames addressed to each relay identified in the list to generate proofs of use comprising at least the signatures contained in the PoU frame, the transaction frames being designed to trigger the sending by each relay of a proof of use recorded in a shared memory.