Multi-device Remote Attestation via Key Reuse
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Solution Overview
Problem
Existing remote attestation protocols assume a single entity checks and provisions secrets to trusted execution environments, leading to significant overhead and trust assumptions when multiple devices need to verify the trustworthiness of an enclave, as each device must run separate attestation protocols and agree with platform verifier nodes.
Innovation Solution
A protocol that allows multiple devices to verify the trustworthiness of an enclave by reusing key material from a previous Diffie-Hellman key exchange and having the application provider node forward secret key material, enabling devices to derive keys for secure communication with the enclave, thus minimizing overhead and trust assumptions.
Engineering Contradictions & Design Principles
Engineering Contradiction Analysis
1Reliability
If each device runs separate attestation protocols with the enclave, then each device can verify the trustworthiness of the enclave, but the message exchange and computational overhead increase significantly
Solution Approach 1:
The patent combines multiple separate attestation protocols into a single unified protocol. Instead of each device independently running separate attestation exchanges with the enclave, the application provider node performs a single attestation protocol with the enclave and then distributes the resulting proof information to multiple devices. This merging reduces the total number of message exchanges and computational operations required for trust verification across multiple devices.
Solution Approach 2:
The application provider node performs the attestation protocol with the enclave in advance, before multiple devices need to verify trust. The proof information generated from this preliminary attestation is then distributed to devices, eliminating the need for each device to conduct its own separate attestation exchange with the enclave.
2Reliability
If multiple devices independently verify the enclave, then each device can establish secure communication, but trust assumptions and complexity increase
Solution Approach 1:
The application provider node serves as an intermediary between devices and the enclave for trust verification. Instead of devices directly interacting with the enclave for attestation, the application provider node performs the attestation protocol with the enclave and then provides proof information to devices. This intermediary role reduces the trust assumptions devices must make about the enclave directly, as they trust the application provider node's verification process instead.
3Reliability
If each device generates and shares secret keys with the enclave, then secure communication is established, but the key provisioning overhead increases
Solution Approach 1:
The patent merges the key provisioning process across multiple devices. Instead of each device independently generating and exchanging secret keys with the enclave through separate Diffie-Hellman key exchanges, the application provider node facilitates a unified key provisioning process where devices can derive secure communication keys from shared proof information, reducing the overall key provisioning overhead.
Data Source
AI summary
Systems and methods for attesting an enclave in a network. A method includes receiving, by a first device, proof information from an application provider entity that the enclave is secure, wherein the proof information includes a public part, Ga, of information used by the enclave to derive a Diffie-Hellman key in a key generation process with the application provider entity, processing, by the first device, the proof information to verify that the enclave is secure and ensuring that Ga is authentic and/or valid, deriving, by the first device, a new Diffie-Hellman key, based on Ga and x, wherein x is a private part of information used by the first device to derive the new Diffie-Hellman key, and sending, by the first device, a message including Ga and a public part, Gx, of the information used by the first device to derive the new Diffie-Hellman key to the enclave.