Retention Lock Verification Log for Tamper-Evident Backup Audits

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Solution Overview

Problem

Existing backup systems lack a secure method to maintain and audit the retention lock status of files, which is crucial for compliance with regulations like SEC 17a-4(f), as backup application catalogs are vulnerable to malicious corruption.

Innovation Solution

A cryptographic method is employed to certify the retention lock status by encrypting the lock status using an encryption key, generating a token that is signed by the storage target, and storing it in the backup application catalog, allowing for secure audit of the lock status.

Engineering Contradictions & Design Principles

VSEngineering Contradiction Analysis

1Difficulty of detecting and measuring

If retention lock status is stored in backup application catalog, then audit capability is improved, but security against malicious corruption deteriorates

Engineering Contradiction:
Improveaudit capabilityVSAvoidsecurity against corruption
Core Design Contradiction:
Difficulty of detecting and measuringVSReliability

Solution Approach 1:

The patent introduces cryptographic intermediaries (digital signatures, hash functions, and encryption keys) between the retention lock status and the catalog storage. The retention lock status is signed by the storage target using its private key, creating a cryptographic proof that cannot be forged. This intermediary cryptographic layer protects the status information from malicious corruption while enabling audit verification through public key validation.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #24Intermediary (Mediator)

Solution Approach 2:

The patent creates cryptographic copies of the retention lock status through digital signatures and hash values. Instead of storing only the raw status information, the system stores cryptographic representations (signed hashes, encrypted versions) that serve as tamper-evident copies. These cryptographic copies can be verified independently to detect any corruption of the original status information.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #26Copying

2Reliability

If cryptographic certification method is implemented, then security of retention lock status is improved, but system complexity increases

Engineering Contradiction:
Improvesecurity of retention lock statusVSAvoidsystem complexity
Core Design Contradiction:
ReliabilityVSDevice complexity

Solution Approach 1:

The storage target performs self-certification by signing its own retention lock status with its private key. This self-service approach eliminates the need for external certificate authorities or complex trust management infrastructure. The storage target autonomously generates cryptographic proofs of its retention lock state, simplifying the overall system architecture while maintaining high security standards.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #25Self-service

3Reliability

If retention lock status is made tamper-evident, then compliance with regulations is improved, but processing overhead increases

Engineering Contradiction:
Improvecompliance with regulationsVSAvoidprocessing overhead
Core Design Contradiction:
ReliabilityVSProductivity

Solution Approach 1:

The cryptographic signing of retention lock status is performed preliminarily at the time of lock creation or status change, rather than continuously during operations. This preliminary action creates a cryptographic snapshot that can be later verified without requiring continuous cryptographic processing. The pre-computed signatures enable efficient compliance verification with minimal ongoing processing overhead.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #10Preliminary action

Data Source

PatentUS12585547B2Cryptographic method to certify retention lock status with an embedded verification log in a backup system
Publication Date: 2026.03.24 DELL PROD LP
  • US12585547B2 patent drawing
  • US12585547B2 patent drawing
  • US12585547B2 patent drawing

AI summary

The retention lock (RL) status for a backup file stored in a storage target is certified by obtaining the RL status and encrypting it using an encryption key process to create a certified RL status. Verification logs are kept by appending the time of certification to a new token that can be audited. Each time a certification is attempted, a log corresponding to the latest attempt and the latest timestamp is added to the end of the verification list. This verification log may be implemented through a verification timestamp is appended to the token, or a verification log that is its own token. The verification log is maintained in a backup system and made available to an auditor for review of the certified RL status of the locked files.