5G RNAU Security Verification Parameter Consistency
Find Innovative SolutionsGenerate Solutions
Solution Overview
Problem
In 5G systems, terminals in an RRC inactive state face challenges in securely updating their radio access network-based notification areas, as they need to determine the correct security verification parameter for successful RNAU processes, especially when the anchor access network device changes, leading to inconsistent security parameters and failed verification.
Innovation Solution
The method involves sending a first message to an access network device requesting an RRC connection or RNAU, with a security parameter including a C-RNTI, and determining the security verification parameter based on an indication from the access network device, ensuring consistency with the stored parameter for successful security verification.
Engineering Contradictions & Design Principles
Engineering Contradiction Analysis
1Productivity
If the terminal uses a security verification parameter from a previous RNAU process, then the RNAU process can be initiated, but the security verification may fail due to parameter inconsistency when the anchor access network device changes
Solution Approach 1:
The access network device sends indication information to the terminal regarding whether the anchor access network device has changed. The terminal uses this feedback to determine whether to update the security verification parameter, ensuring consistency between the terminal's parameter selection and the network's verification capability.
Solution Approach 2:
Before the terminal initiates the RNAU process, the access network device performs preliminary determination of whether the anchor access network device has changed and sends indication information to the terminal. This preliminary action ensures the terminal selects the correct security verification parameter before the actual RNAU, preventing verification failure.
2Loss of time
If the terminal determines the security verification parameter autonomously without network indication, then the RNAU process can proceed quickly, but the security parameter consistency cannot be guaranteed
Solution Approach 1:
The access network device provides feedback through indication information that directly guides the terminal's parameter selection. This feedback mechanism eliminates the need for complex autonomous determination while ensuring the terminal selects the correct security verification parameter consistent with network state.
3Adaptability or versatility
If the terminal stores multiple security verification parameters from different base stations, then the terminal can serve multiple base stations, but the complexity of determining the correct parameter increases
Solution Approach 1:
The access network device sends indication information that directly identifies which security verification parameter the terminal should use. This feedback simplifies the terminal's decision-making process, transforming a complex multi-parameter selection problem into a simple indication-following operation, while maintaining the ability to serve multiple base stations.
4Loss of information
If the access network device does not provide indication information about anchor device changes, then the signaling overhead is reduced, but the terminal cannot determine the correct security verification parameter
Solution Approach 1:
The patent extracts only the essential information needed for parameter determination - a compact indication bit or field indicating whether the anchor access network device has changed. This minimal extraction provides sufficient guidance for the terminal while keeping signaling overhead low, avoiding transmission of redundant information.
Data Source
Figure 1~3
Figure 4
Figure 4-1A
AI summary
Embodiments of this application disclose a communication method and a communications apparatus, and relate to the field of communications technologies. Therefore, a terminal and an access network device can use consistent security verification parameters to successfully implement security verification in an RNAU process. The method may include: sending a first message to an access network device, where the first message is used for requesting to resume a radio resource control RRC connection or requesting to perform a radio access network-based notification area update RNAU; receiving a second message from the access network device, where the second message includes first information, and the first information is related to a security verification parameter; and determining the security verification parameter based on the first information.