Root CA Certificate Database for Revocation and Compromise Containment
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Solution Overview
Problem
Conventional Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) systems are vulnerable to catastrophic security breakdowns due to the potential compromise of a single root Certificate Authority (CA), lacking formal mechanisms for revoking compromised root certificates, and relying on informal methods like software updates and word-of-mouth for identifying compromised root certificates.
Innovation Solution
Implementing a root CA with multiple key pairs and a cryptographically authenticated database of data blocks that allows for systematic revocation and validation of root certificates, ensuring no single root certificate becomes a single point of failure, using a chain of data blocks that are cryptographically verified and managed independently.
Engineering Contradictions & Design Principles
Engineering Contradiction Analysis
1Device complexity
If a single root certificate authority is used in conventional PKI systems, then the system structure is simple and easy to manage, but the system becomes vulnerable to catastrophic security breakdowns when the root CA is compromised
Solution Approach 1:
The patent divides the single root CA into multiple root CAs, each with its own key pair and certificate. This segmentation creates a distributed trust model where the compromise of one root CA does not affect the others, thereby resolving the contradiction between simple structure and security reliability.
2Reliability
If multiple key pairs are implemented in the root CA, then security is enhanced by containing damage from compromise, but the system complexity increases
Solution Approach 1:
The system segments the root CA into multiple independent key pairs and certificates, allowing selective revocation of compromised certificates while maintaining others. This resolves the contradiction by distributing security risks across multiple independent units.
Solution Approach 2:
The system dynamically manages multiple certificates with the ability to add, revoke, or update individual certificates as needed. This dynamic management allows the system to adapt to security threats while maintaining operational simplicity through automated processes.
3Ease of operation
If a cryptographically authenticated database is implemented to manage multiple root certificates, then the ability to revoke and verify certificates is improved, but the device complexity increases
Solution Approach 1:
The cryptographically authenticated database acts as an intermediary between the multiple root CAs and the verification processes. It provides a centralized mechanism for managing, storing, and verifying the authenticity of multiple certificates, resolving the contradiction by simplifying certificate management operations despite the increased structural complexity.
4Device complexity
If conventional PKI systems rely on public announcements for revocation, then the system structure remains simple, but the response time to security threats is delayed
Solution Approach 1:
The system implements cryptographic authentication and verification mechanisms that provide immediate feedback on certificate validity. When a certificate is revoked, the change is cryptographically recorded and can be immediately verified by all system participants, eliminating the time delay associated with public announcements while maintaining manageable system structure.
Data Source
AI summary
In a general aspect, a cryptography system includes a multiple-key pair root certificate authority. In some aspects, a plurality of distinct cryptographic pairs of public keys and private keys of a root certificate authority are generated. A plurality of distinct self-signed root certificates of the root certificate authority are generated. The plurality of distinct self-signed root certificates are each based on and correspond to a respective one of plurality of distinct cryptographic key pairs. A cryptographically authenticated database is generated that includes the plurality of distinct self-signed root certificates and represents the root certificate authority. The cryptographically authenticated database includes validity information of each of the plurality of self-signed root certificates. The cryptographically authenticated database is distributed to entities in a public key infrastructure. The entities can use the validity information to cryptographically verify the validity or invalidity of each of the plurality of distinct self-signed root certificate.