RRC Connection Release Token Integrity Protection
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Solution Overview
Problem
Current solutions for handling RRC connections in CP CIoT lack secure mechanisms for RRC Connection Release messages, making them vulnerable to Denial of Service attacks due to the absence of AS security, which is not supported for DoNAS functionality.
Innovation Solution
Implementing an AS-based token as integrity protection for RRC Connection Release messages, where a shared key and algorithm between the UE and the network are used to verify the authenticity of the release token, ensuring that only genuine release messages are processed.
Engineering Contradictions & Design Principles
Engineering Contradiction Analysis
1Device complexity
If RRC Connection Release message is sent without AS security for DoNAS, then signaling overhead is reduced and simplicity is improved, but security is worsened making the system vulnerable to spoofed messages and DoS attacks
Solution Approach 1:
A release token is introduced as an intermediary element between the RRC Connection Release message and the UE verification process. The token contains integrity protection information that mediates the trust relationship, allowing the UE to verify message authenticity without requiring full AS security establishment. This resolves the contradiction by adding a lightweight verification mechanism that doesn't require complex AS security procedures.
Solution Approach 2:
The release token is prepared and included in the RRC Connection Release message before the UE performs verification. The token预先 contains the necessary integrity protection data (such as MAC or signature) generated using shared security context, enabling the UE to verify authenticity in advance of any potential attack. This preliminary preparation of verification data prevents spoofed messages without requiring post-message security checks.
2Reliability
If AS security is established for RRC Connection Release, then security is improved, but signaling overhead increases and DoNAS simplicity is compromised
Solution Approach 1:
The integrity protection function is extracted from the full AS security establishment process. Instead of establishing complete AS security (which includes encryption, integrity protection, and key management), only the essential integrity protection component is extracted and embedded in the release token. This allows message integrity verification without the overhead of full AS security procedures, resolving the contradiction between security and signaling overhead.
Solution Approach 2:
The release token is designed as a lightweight, single-use verification object. It contains only the necessary integrity protection data (such as a MAC or signature) without the overhead of establishing persistent security contexts. The token is generated, used for verification, and then discarded, providing security without the long-term signaling overhead of AS security establishment. This disposable approach provides just-enough security at minimal cost.
3Adaptability or versatility
If existing RLF handling mechanism is used for CP CIoT, then handling capability is improved, but security is worsened because AS security is not supported
Solution Approach 1:
The solution dynamically adapts the verification mechanism based on security context availability. When AS security is not established (DoNAS case), the system uses the release token with integrity protection based on shared keys or other lightweight mechanisms. When AS security is available, traditional verification can be used. This dynamic adaptation allows RLF handling capability to be maintained across different security scenarios without compromising security in DoNAS cases.
Data Source
AI summary
According to certain embodiments, a method for use in a wireless device comprises receiving a release message from a network node operating in a network. The release message comprises a first release token and an instruction to release a radio resource control (RRC) connection. The method comprises determining whether the first release token passes verification and determining an action to perform based on whether the first release token passes verification. In response to a determination that the first release token passes verification, the action comprises releasing the RRC connection.