RSRP Time-Window Analysis for Reference Signal Spoofing Detection

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Solution Overview

Problem

Wireless communication systems face challenges in detecting spoofing attacks on reference signal received power (RSRP) measurements, which can compromise positioning accuracy and security.

Innovation Solution

A method is introduced to detect spoofing attacks by performing RSRP measurements within specific time windows and analyzing differentials between RSRP measurements across multiple time windows, with optional additional angle-based measurements, and transmitting an indication of the spoofing attack determination to communications devices.

Engineering Contradictions & Design Principles

VSEngineering Contradiction Analysis

1Measurement precision

If RSRP measurements are performed for positioning, then positioning accuracy is improved, but the system becomes vulnerable to spoofing attacks

Engineering Contradiction:
Improvepositioning accuracyVSAvoidsecurity against spoofing attacks
Core Design Contradiction:
Measurement precisionVSReliability

Solution Approach 1:

The system performs preliminary RSRP measurements in earlier time windows before the current measurement. These historical measurements are stored and used as a baseline for comparison. By establishing this preliminary data, the system can detect spoofing attacks by identifying abnormal differentials between current and historical measurements, thus maintaining both positioning accuracy and security.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #10Preliminary action

Solution Approach 2:

The system continuously compares current RSRP measurements against historical measurements from earlier time windows, creating a feedback mechanism. When a spoofing attack is detected through abnormal differential analysis, the system can trigger alerts or mitigation actions. This feedback loop enables real-time detection while preserving the integrity of positioning measurements.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #23Feedback

2Measurement precision

If multiple RSRP measurements are performed across different time windows to detect spoofing, then detection accuracy is improved, but measurement complexity increases

Engineering Contradiction:
Improvespoofing detection accuracyVSAvoidmeasurement complexity
Core Design Contradiction:
Measurement precisionVSDevice complexity

Solution Approach 1:

The measurement process is segmented into distinct time windows, with each window containing a specific number of samples. The first time window contains a first set of samples for initial measurements, while subsequent windows contain additional sets of samples for comparative analysis. This segmentation allows the system to perform multiple measurements without overwhelming complexity, as each segment is processed independently and then compared.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #1Segmentation

Solution Approach 2:

The system performs a limited number of measurements focused specifically on detecting spoofing attacks, rather than exhaustive measurements of all possible parameters. By concentrating on the essential differential analysis between time windows, the system achieves adequate detection accuracy without unnecessary complexity. The measurement strategy is tailored to the specific threat rather than attempting comprehensive analysis.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #16Partial or excessive action

Data Source

PatentUS12563397B2Spoofing determination based on reference signal received power measurements
Publication Date: 2026.02.24 QUALCOMM INC
  • US12563397B2 patent drawing
  • US12563397B2 patent drawing
  • US12563397B2 patent drawing

AI summary

In an aspect, a wireless node performs a first RSRP measurement of an RS-P based on a first set of samples within a first time window of an RS-P symbol or resource, and determines whether a spoofing attack is associated with RS-P based on the first RSRP measurement and one or more other RSRP measurements of one or more other sets of samples within one or more earlier time windows of the RS-P symbol or resource. The wireless node transmits, to a communications device (e.g., position estimation entity), an indication (e.g., in a measurement report) of the spoofing attack determination. The communications device performs at least one action based at least in part upon the indication of the spoofing attack determination.