Threat Context-Aware Packet Filtering for False-Positive Control
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Solution Overview
Problem
Existing cyber defense systems face challenges in determining the optimal disposition and directives for in-transit packets due to uncertain and probabilistic threat risks, leading to potential false negatives or false positives in network protection.
Innovation Solution
Implementing a system where the disposition and directives for in-transit packets are determined in real-time based on observed threat context information, including local and global threat context, using artificial neural networks and efficient data structures to ensure timely and accurate decision-making.
Engineering Contradictions & Design Principles
Engineering Contradiction Analysis
1Reliability
If packet filtering rules are applied to block all packets matching threat indicators, then network security is improved, but false positives increase and legitimate traffic is blocked
Solution Approach 1:
The system applies different filtering actions to different packets matching the same threat indicator based on local packet characteristics. Instead of uniformly blocking all packets matching a threat indicator, the system evaluates each packet's context (protocol type, port, source/destination information) and applies appropriate actions (block, allow, log, capture) locally to each packet, reducing false positives while maintaining security.
Solution Approach 2:
The system dynamically determines filtering actions at runtime based on current threat context and packet characteristics. Rather than using static pre-configured rules, the system evaluates packets against multiple threat indicators and contextual factors in real-time, allowing the filtering behavior to adapt dynamically to the specific packet being processed, thereby reducing false positives.
2Measurement precision
If comprehensive threat context analysis is performed for each packet, then false positives are reduced, but processing time increases causing network latency
Solution Approach 1:
The system segments the threat context analysis into discrete, evaluable components for each packet. Instead of performing a single comprehensive analysis, the system breaks down the evaluation into multiple independent checks (threat indicator matching, protocol validation, contextual factor assessment) that can be processed efficiently and independently, reducing overall processing time while maintaining detection accuracy.
Solution Approach 2:
The system uses lightweight, disposable data structures and evaluation mechanisms for each packet processing event. Rather than maintaining complex state information for each packet, the system creates minimal contextual objects just-in-time for evaluation and discards them after processing, reducing memory overhead and processing time while maintaining the necessary analysis depth.
3Reliability
If multiple filtering actions are applied to each packet, then network protection is enhanced, but device complexity increases
Solution Approach 1:
The system implements a universal packet processing framework that handles multiple filtering actions (block, allow, log, capture) through a single unified evaluation mechanism. Instead of implementing separate complex systems for each action, the system uses a multi-functional architecture where the same core evaluation logic determines the appropriate action based on packet characteristics and threat context, reducing overall system complexity.
Solution Approach 2:
The system introduces an intermediary evaluation layer that sits between packet reception and action execution. This intermediary component assesses packets against threat indicators and contextual factors, then translates the assessment results into appropriate filtering actions. This mediator architecture simplifies the system by centralizing the decision-making logic and providing a clear separation between evaluation and execution functions.
Data Source
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AI summary
A threat intelligence gateway (TIG) may protect TCP/IP networks from network (e.g., Internet) threats by enforcing certain policies on in-transit packets that are crossing network boundaries. The policies may be composed of packet filtering rules with packet-matching criteria derived from cyber threat intelligence (CTI) associated with Internet threats. These CTI-derived packet-filtering rules may be created offline by policy creation and management servers, which may distribute the policies to subscribing TIGs that subsequently enforce the policies on in-transit packets. Each packet filtering rule may specify a disposition that may be applied to a matching in-transit packet, such as deny/block/drop the in-transit packet or pass/allow/forward the in-transit packet, and also may specify directives that may be applied to a matching in-transit packet, such as log, capture, spoof-tcp-rst, etc. Often, however, the selection of a rule's disposition and directives that best protect the associated network may not be optimally determined before a matching in-transit packet is observed by the associated TIG. In such cases, threat context information that may only be available (e.g., computable) at in-transit packet observation and/or filtering time, such as current time-of-day, current TIG/network location, current TIG/network administrator, the in-transit packet being determined to be part of an active attack on the network, etc., may be helpful to determine the disposition and directives that may best protect the network from the threat associated with the in-transit packet. The present disclosure describes examples of methods, systems, and apparatuses that may be used for efficiently determining (e.g., accessing and/or computing), in response to the in-transit packet, threat context information associated with an in-transit packet. The threat context information may be used to efficiently determine the disposition and/or one or more directives to apply to the in-transit packet. This may result in dispositions and/or directives being applied to in-transit packets that better protect the network as compared with solely using dispositions and directives that were predetermined prior to receiving the in-transit packet.