S8 Interface GTP-C Parameter Validation for Signaling Attack Prevention
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Solution Overview
Problem
In 4G mobile communication networks, the communication between SGW and PGW via S8 interface poses a security risk due to potential hacker attacks, as existing security mechanisms like IP address Sec cannot prevent signaling attacks above the IP address layer.
Innovation Solution
The proposed method involves an SGW or edge node receiving GTP-C messages from a PGW, determining if they are from an S8 interface, and validating characteristic parameters such as message type, source IP address, and IMSI. If invalid, the message is discarded or an error code response is sent, effectively preventing hacker attacks by ensuring only valid messages are processed.
Engineering Contradictions & Design Principles
Engineering Contradiction Analysis
1Adaptability or versatility
If the SGW and PGW communicate via S8 interface between different operators, then network interoperability and roaming capability are improved, but communication security deteriorates due to potential hacker attacks
Solution Approach 1:
The patent applies preliminary action by validating characteristic parameters of GTP-C messages before processing them. The SGW checks message types, source IP addresses, and other characteristics in advance to identify and block potential attack messages before they can cause harm to the system
Solution Approach 2:
The patent introduces an intermediary validation mechanism that acts as a mediator between the S8 interface communication and the SGW core system. This validation layer intercepts and examines GTP-C messages, allowing legitimate roaming traffic to pass while blocking malicious signaling attacks
2Reliability
If existing security mechanisms like IP address Sec are used, then basic network security is maintained, but signaling attacks above the IP address layer cannot be prevented
Solution Approach 1:
The patent transitions from single-layer IP address security to multi-dimensional security validation. It examines not only IP addresses but also GTP-C message types, characteristic parameters, and other dimensions of message validation, creating a comprehensive security approach that addresses attacks at multiple layers simultaneously
3Object-affected harmful factors
If all GTP-C messages are validated regardless of interface, then security is improved, but processing overhead and system complexity increase
Solution Approach 1:
The patent applies local quality by implementing validation selectively based on the interface type. It specifically targets S8 interface messages for validation while potentially using different or simplified processing for other interfaces like S5, optimizing security resources where they are most needed without unnecessarily complicating other communication paths
Data Source
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AI summary
Embodiments of the present invention disclose a signaling attack prevention method and apparatus. The method includes: receiving a general packet radio service (GPRS) Tunneling Protocol (GTP-C) message sent by a public data network gateway (PGW); determining whether the GTP-C message is received from an S8 interface; when the GTP-C message is received from the S8 interface, determining whether a characteristic parameter of the GTP-C message is valid; and if the characteristic parameter of the GTP-C message is invalid, discarding the GTP-C message or returning, to the PGW, a GTP-C response message carrying an error code cause value. By means of determining validity of each parameter in the GTP-C message, a hacker can be effectively prevented from attacking an SGW by using each attack path, and communication security is improved.