Simultaneous Ascending Price Auction for Ad Inventory Allocation

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Solution Overview

Problem

The inefficient allocation of advertising inventory among advertisers and publishers leads to suboptimal value realization for both parties, as existing methods fail to balance bidder preferences and publisher constraints effectively, resulting in unallocated spots and revenue loss.

Innovation Solution

A simultaneous ascending price auction (SAA) mechanism is employed to allocate advertising inventory, allowing for simultaneous scheduling and pricing of advertisement spots or blocks based on bidder preferences and publisher constraints, with optimization techniques such as per-spot and per-bid pricing, filler bidder allocation, and re-allocation strategies to ensure complete block allocation and maximize revenue.

Engineering Contradictions & Design Principles

VSEngineering Contradiction Analysis

1Productivity

If conventional advertising inventory allocation methods are used, then advertisers can select inventory based on targeting and revenue projections, but the allocation is inefficient leading to unallocated spots and revenue loss

Engineering Contradiction:
Improveallocation efficiencyVSAvoidrevenue loss
Core Design Contradiction:
ProductivityVSLoss of energy

Solution Approach 1:

The patent transforms the advertising inventory allocation from a conventional selective process to a market-driven auction process. By changing the allocation mechanism parameter from manual selection to automated auction bidding, the system achieves efficient allocation where spots are assigned to the highest bidders, eliminating unallocated spots and maximizing revenue without manual intervention

Inventive Principle:
Principle #35Parameter changes

Solution Approach 2:

The auction mechanism enables the advertising inventory system to self-allocate spots without external intervention. Bidders automatically submit bids, the system processes allocations based on bid criteria, and spots are assigned efficiently through the auction process itself, eliminating the need for manual allocation decisions and ensuring complete utilization of inventory

Inventive Principle:
Principle #25Self-service

2Ease of operation

If publishers place restrictions on advertising inventory to efficiently allocate advertisements, then allocation control is improved, but the complexity of managing constraints and preferences increases

Engineering Contradiction:
Improveallocation controlVSAvoidconstraint management complexity
Core Design Contradiction:
Ease of operationVSDevice complexity

Solution Approach 1:

The auction mechanism incorporates continuous feedback loops where bidders receive information about available spots and allocation status, and the system adjusts allocations based on bid responses. This feedback mechanism allows publishers to maintain control over inventory restrictions while automatically managing the complexity of multiple constraints through iterative bidding processes

Inventive Principle:
Principle #23Feedback

Solution Approach 2:

The patent introduces an intermediary auction system that sits between publisher constraints and advertiser preferences. This intermediary mechanism translates complex publisher restrictions and bidder preferences into a unified allocation process, managing constraint complexity automatically through auction rules rather than direct manual coordination

Inventive Principle:
Principle #24Intermediary (Mediator)

3Adaptability or versatility

If advertisement spots are allocated individually based on per-spot price, then pricing flexibility is improved, but blocks with unallocated spots remain inefficient

Engineering Contradiction:
Improvepricing flexibilityVSAvoidblock allocation efficiency
Core Design Contradiction:
Adaptability or versatilityVSProductivity

Solution Approach 1:

The patent implements dynamic allocation that adapts between per-spot and per-block pricing strategies. The system initially allocates spots individually based on per-spot bids, then dynamically identifies and reallocates blocks containing unallocated spots using per-block pricing, allowing the mechanism to flexibly respond to allocation patterns and eliminate inefficiencies

Inventive Principle:
Principle #15Dynamics

Solution Approach 2:

The allocation process operates in periodic phases: first individual per-spot allocation, then periodic block-level review and reallocation. This periodic action between different pricing strategies ensures that both pricing flexibility and block allocation efficiency are maintained through systematic alternation between allocation approaches

Inventive Principle:
Principle #19Periodic action

Data Source

PatentUS8615436B2Advertising inventory allocation
Publication Date: 2013.12.24 GOOGLE LLC
  • US8615436B2 patent drawing
  • US8615436B2 patent drawing
  • US8615436B2 patent drawing

AI summary

A simultaneous ascending price auction (“SAA”) can be used to allocate advertising inventory to bidders. The advertising inventory can be, for example, radio or television advertisement spots (“spots”). The bidders can be advertisers that can provide advertisements for presentation in the spots. Two or more contiguous spots can define an advertising block. Spots or advertising blocks can be allocated to advertisers by the SAA mechanism based on bid criteria. The SAA can perform simultaneous advertisement scheduling and pricing. The auction allocation can be optimized to facilitate efficient allocation of advertisements to spots or blocks.