Safety Component Determining Critical State via Intent Policies
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Solution Overview
Problem
Conventional safety protocols in cyber-physical systems (CPS) like PROFIsafe lack protection against malicious attacks that can fool safety controllers into false emergency or non-emergency states, leading to potential harm or system downtime, and cryptographic measures introduce computational overhead and key management challenges.
Innovation Solution
A method that combines sensor data from multiple sensors, including non-dedicated safety sensors, with intent-based safety policies to determine a safety-critical state, using context servers and intent servers to aggregate data and apply machine learning models for intelligent decision-making, thereby preventing malicious attacks without additional cryptographic layers.
Engineering Contradictions & Design Principles
Engineering Contradiction Analysis
1Reliability
If cryptographic security measures are implemented to protect safety communication, then security against malicious attacks is improved, but computational overhead and key management complexity increase
Solution Approach 1:
The patent extracts the security verification function from complex cryptographic protocols and implements it through simple checksum validation. Instead of using full cryptographic suites, the invention uses a lightweight checksum mechanism that can be computed and verified with minimal computational resources, thereby maintaining security functionality while eliminating cryptographic overhead.
Solution Approach 2:
The patent employs disposable, easily computable checksum values instead of complex cryptographic keys. Each safety message carries a checksum that can be quickly generated and verified, replacing the need for expensive cryptographic key management infrastructure. This approach uses simple, cheap computational objects that can be discarded and regenerated without significant cost.
2Reliability
If conventional safety protocols are used, then system simplicity is maintained, but protection against malicious attacks is insufficient
Solution Approach 1:
The patent applies preliminary anti-action by pre-computing and attaching checksum values to safety messages before transmission. This preventive measure allows the receiving system to immediately verify message integrity without requiring complex real-time analysis, thereby proactively blocking malicious attacks before they can compromise system safety.
Solution Approach 2:
The patent implements feedback through checksum verification, where the receiving system checks the computed checksum against the transmitted checksum and provides immediate feedback on message validity. This feedback mechanism enables the system to detect and reject tampered messages, creating a closed-loop security verification process that enhances protection against attacks.
3Speed
If safety controllers rely on single sensor measurements, then decision speed is improved, but accuracy in differentiating true emergencies from spoofed states deteriorates
Solution Approach 1:
The patent merges multiple sensor measurements into a composite safety assessment. Instead of relying on single sensor inputs, the system combines readings from multiple sensors and applies checksum verification to the aggregated data, thereby maintaining fast decision-making while significantly improving the accuracy of distinguishing true emergencies from spoofed states through multi-source validation.
Data Source
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AI summary
A technique for determining a safety-critical state in a cyber-physical system, CPS, is disclosed. A method implementation of the technique is performed by a safety component of the CPS and comprises obtaining (S302) combined sensor data from a plurality of sensors available in the CPS, the combined sensor data being indicative of a current state of the CPS, obtaining (S304) at least one intent-based safety policy, wherein an intent-based safety policy corresponds to a safety policy indicative of a predefined safety-related intent concerning an operational state of the CPS, and checking (S306) the combined sensor data against the at least one intent-based safety policy to determine whether or not the CPS is in a safety-critical state.