Session Border Controller Packet Policing for DDoS Protection

Solution Overview

Problem

Communications systems face challenges in protecting against distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks, especially when public IP addresses used by Integrated Access Devices (IADs) and Internet Protocol Private Branch Exchanges (IP-PBXs) are unknown, and Network Address Translation (NAT) devices complicate identifying legitimate packets from attack packets.

Innovation Solution

A session border controller (SBC) receives SIP INVITE requests, determines whether they originate from IADs or IP-PBXs based on microflows, and generates packet flow fillrates to differentiate and restrict traffic, using a token bucket policer to manage packet flow until authentication is successful.

Engineering Contradictions & Design Principles

VSEngineering Contradiction Analysis

1Adaptability or versatility

If access network elements receive SIP INVITE requests from unknown IP addresses, then service provision is enabled, but the system becomes susceptible to DDoS attacks

Engineering Contradiction:
Core Design Contradiction:
Adaptability or versatilityVSReliability

Solution Approach 1:

The patent applies preliminary action by establishing a token bucket policer with predefined parameters (fillrate, burst size) before DDoS attacks occur. The policer is configured with a fillrate based on expected legitimate traffic patterns and a burst size to accommodate traffic variations. This pre-configured mechanism enables the system to automatically distinguish between legitimate and malicious traffic without requiring real-time analysis or manual intervention, thus maintaining service provision capability while protecting against DDoS attacks.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #10Preliminary action

2Reliability

If packet flow restrictions are applied to mitigate DDoS attacks, then attack protection is improved, but legitimate traffic may be blocked

Engineering Contradiction:
Core Design Contradiction:
ReliabilityVSEase of operation

Solution Approach 1:

The patent applies parameter changes by dynamically adjusting the token bucket policer's fillrate and burst size parameters based on observed traffic patterns. The system monitors packet flows and modifies the policer parameters in real-time to adapt to changing traffic conditions. This allows the system to tighten restrictions during DDoS attacks while loosening them during normal operation, ensuring legitimate traffic is not blocked while maintaining effective attack protection.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #35Parameter changes

3Reliability

If bandwidth is allocated to protect against DDoS attacks, then system resilience is improved, but bandwidth overallocation occurs

Engineering Contradiction:
Core Design Contradiction:
ReliabilityVSQuantity of substance

Solution Approach 1:

The patent applies feedback by implementing a monitoring mechanism that continuously tracks packet flow characteristics and compares them against the token bucket policer parameters. The system uses this feedback to adjust bandwidth allocation dynamically, allowing legitimate traffic to consume available bandwidth while preventing DDoS attacks. The feedback loop ensures that bandwidth is not overallocated to protect against attacks that never occur, while still maintaining sufficient reserves for actual attack scenarios.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #23Feedback

Data Source

PatentUS11218449B2Communications methods, systems and apparatus for packet policing
Publication Date: 2022.01.04
  • US11218449B2 patent drawing
  • US11218449B2 patent drawing
  • US11218449B2 patent drawing

AI summary

The present invention relates to methods, systems and apparatus for providing efficient packet flow fillrate adjustments and providing protection against distributed denial of service attacks. One exemplary embodiment in accordance with the invention is a method of operating a communication system including the steps of receiving, at a session border controller, a first SIP invite request message; making a decision, at the session border controller, as to whether the first SIP invite request originated from an Integrated Access Device or an IP-PBX device; generating, at the SBC, a packet flow fillrate based on said decision as to whether the SIP invite request originated at an Integrated Access Device or an Internet Protocol-Private Branch Exchange (IP-PBX) device.