Trusted Path Certification in Software Defined Networks
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Solution Overview
Problem
Current solutions for ensuring a trusted path for sensitive data in cloud networks, particularly in software-defined networking (SDN) environments, lack certification mechanisms to verify that sensitive data follow configured paths compliant with security policies, and do not provide strong security guarantees or tamper-proof evidence for policy enforcement.
Innovation Solution
The method involves embedding secure elements with flow rule certifiers in network nodes to generate and collect flow rule certificates and sensitive flow trace certificates, which are then verified by a trusted path certifier to ensure that each enforced flow rule is satisfied and the sensitive data flow follows the intended trusted path.
Engineering Contradictions & Design Principles
Engineering Contradiction Analysis
1Reliability
If known solutions like TLS, SSL, or VPN are used for communication protection, then encryption of data in transit is achieved, but they do not prevent inferring information from traffic monitoring or block attacks on un-trusted nodes along the path
Solution Approach 1:
The patent introduces an intermediary certification mechanism consisting of a trusted path certifier and flow rule certifiers embedded in network nodes. This intermediary system verifies and certifies that sensitive data flows follow the intended trusted path through the network, providing tamper-proof evidence that prevents traffic monitoring and inference attacks by ensuring path compliance.
Solution Approach 2:
The patent implements preliminary action by establishing flow rules and certificates before data transmission occurs. The trusted path certifier pre-configures flow rules in network nodes and generates certificates that verify path compliance beforehand, preventing security issues rather than addressing them after they occur.
2Adaptability or versatility
If sensitive data are transferred through dynamic cloud networks with migrating virtual machines, then network flexibility and adaptability are improved, but the ability to guarantee a trusted path between network function virtualizations deteriorates
Solution Approach 1:
The patent implements feedback mechanisms where flow rule certifiers continuously monitor and verify that data flows follow the certified trusted path even as network conditions change. The system provides feedback about path compliance, enabling dynamic adaptation while maintaining security guarantees through continuous verification and recertification when needed.
Solution Approach 2:
The patent makes the security system dynamic by allowing flow rules and certificates to be updated as network conditions change. When virtual machines migrate or network topology changes, the system can dynamically recertify trusted paths while maintaining continuous security verification, thus adapting to network dynamics without compromising reliability.
3Reliability
If flow rule certifiers are embedded in all network nodes to provide certification, then strong security guarantees and tamper-proof evidence are achieved, but device complexity and implementation cost increase
Solution Approach 1:
The patent segments the certification function into a hierarchical structure with a trusted path certifier that manages overall certification and flow rule certifiers embedded in individual network nodes. Each node only needs to implement the flow rule certifier functionality, which verifies local flow rules, rather than implementing the entire certification system, thus reducing individual node complexity while maintaining overall system reliability.
Data Source
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AI summary
A method to certify a trusted path (N1-N2-N3-N4) for transferring a given sensitive data flow (SDF) in a software defined network comprising a plurality of nodes (N1, N2, N3, N4, N5), a trusted path enforcer (TPE), and a trusted path certifier (TPC); comprises the following steps: - sending (2) at least one enforced flow rule (EFR), for configuring said trusted path, from the trusted path enforcer (TPE) to flow rule certifiers (FRC1, FRC2, FRC3, FRC4) respectively embedded in or connected to all the nodes of the trusted path (N1, N2, N3, N4); - sending from each said flow rule certifier (FRC1, FRC2, FRC3, FRC4) to the trusted path certifier (TPC): -- a flow rule certificate (FRCA), if said flow rule certifier detects that an enforced flow rule (EFR) it has received is actually satisfied by the configuration of the node where it is embedded in or connected to; -- a sensitive flow traces certificate (SFTC), if said flow rule certifier detects that the given sensitive data flow (SDF) is actually crossing the node where it is embedded in or connected to; - collecting all the flow rule certificates (FRCA), and deducing from them whether each enforced flow rule is satisfied, or not; - and collecting all the sensitive flow trace certificates (SFTC), and deducing from them whether the sensitive data flow has been correctly routed along the whole trusted path, or not.