Secondary Hash Matching for Privacy-Preserving Passcode Cracking

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Solution Overview

Problem

Existing hash cracking methods require users to submit their passcode hashes to a service provider in the clear, compromising security and relying on the provider's trustworthiness, and they are resource-intensive, necessitating specialized hardware.

Innovation Solution

A privacy-preserving hash cracking method where users compute a secondary hash on their hashed passcodes, submit only a defined portion of this secondary hash to a service provider, and perform the final matching locally, using a centralized wordlist to reduce resource demands and maintain security.

Engineering Contradictions & Design Principles

VSEngineering Contradiction Analysis

1Productivity

If users submit their passcode hashes to a service provider in the clear, then the service provider can perform hash cracking, but security is compromised and users must trust the provider

Engineering Contradiction:
Improvehash cracking capabilityVSAvoidsecurity
Core Design Contradiction:
ProductivityVSReliability

Solution Approach 1:

The hash cracking process is segmented into two parts: the service provider performs preliminary cracking on hashed versions of passcodes and stores results in a database, while the user's device performs final verification by comparing the submitted hash against retrieved results. This segmentation allows the service provider to handle computational work without accessing actual passcode hashes, thereby maintaining security while enabling cracking functionality.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #1Segmentation

Solution Approach 2:

A hashed version of the passcode serves as an intermediary between the user's actual passcode and the cracking database. The service provider cracks this intermediary hash rather than the original passcode hash, and the user's device verifies the result by comparing against the submitted intermediary hash. This intermediary mechanism enables the service provider to perform cracking operations without compromising user security.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #24Intermediary (Mediator)

2Productivity

If specialized hardware with GPUs is used for hash cracking, then computational speed is improved, but hardware cost and complexity increase

Engineering Contradiction:
Improvecomputational speedVSAvoidhardware requirements
Core Design Contradiction:
ProductivityVSDevice complexity

Solution Approach 1:

The user's own device performs the final verification step by computing the hash of the candidate passcode and comparing it against the submitted hash. This self-service approach eliminates the need for specialized GPU hardware on user devices, as the computationally intensive preliminary cracking is handled by the service provider's infrastructure, while the user only needs to perform simple hash computation and comparison operations.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #25Self-service

3Ease of operation

If a centralized wordlist is used for hash cracking, then resource demands on user devices are reduced, but network communication is required

Engineering Contradiction:
Improveresource efficiencyVSAvoidnetwork dependency
Core Design Contradiction:
Ease of operationVSDevice complexity

Solution Approach 1:

The service provider performs preliminary hash cracking operations on a centralized database containing hashed versions of passcodes from a wordlist before the user submits their hash. This preliminary action allows the user's device to avoid storing or processing large wordlists locally, reducing resource demands while maintaining the ability to perform cracking through network-based verification.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #10Preliminary action

Data Source

PatentUS12609810B2Low-compute, privacy preserving hash cracking
Publication Date: 2026.04.21 HORIZON 3 AI INC
  • US12609810B2 patent drawing
  • US12609810B2 patent drawing
  • US12609810B2 patent drawing

AI summary

Clear text passcodes are recovered from hashed versions of passcodes in a computational efficient and privacy preserving manner. A service provider computes an initial hash of clear text passcodes in a wordlist, computes a subsequent hash on top of the initial hash, and groups or bins the clear text passcodes based on a portion (e.g., prefix) of their subsequent hashes. A client computes a subsequent hash of a hashed passcode to be cracked, and sends a request specifying a portion of the subsequent hash to the service provider. The service provider returns a set of clear text passcodes whose hash of a hash has a match with the specified portion. The client locally computes the initial hash of clear text passcodes in the returned set, and determines if any of the resulting hashes match the hashed passcode to be cracked, and if so the passcode is considered cracked.