Secret Share Recovery With Cheater Identification and Smaller Shares

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Solution Overview

Problem

Existing (k,n)-threshold secret sharing schemes fail to identify falsified secret information shares and have large share sizes, making them inefficient in detecting cheating and managing secret information securely.

Innovation Solution

A system that generates cheater identifying information using Reed-Solomon error-correcting processes and random polynomials to detect and correct errors in secret information shares, allowing for the identification of falsified shares and reducing share size by using cheater identifying information generated with (k−1)th or (t−1)th polynomials.

Engineering Contradictions & Design Principles

VSEngineering Contradiction Analysis

1Reliability

If the (k,n)-threshold secret sharing scheme is used to split secret information into n shares, then the secret information can be recovered if k out of n shares are put together, but the scheme cannot detect or identify falsified secret information shares, leading to improper recovery of secret information

Engineering Contradiction:
Improvesecret information recovery reliabilityVSAvoidsecret sharing scheme complexity
Core Design Contradiction:
ReliabilityVSDevice complexity

Solution Approach 1:

The patent applies preliminary action by generating verification information (syndrome values) along with the secret shares during the share generation phase. This verification information is prepared in advance to enable future detection of falsified shares without adding complexity to the recovery process itself. The syndrome values are computed using random polynomials and stored with the shares, so that when recovery is attempted, the verification can be performed immediately without additional computational overhead.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #10Preliminary action

Solution Approach 2:

The patent introduces syndrome values as an intermediary element that mediates between the secret shares and the verification process. These syndrome values act as a bridge that allows the system to verify the authenticity of shares without directly examining the secret information itself. The syndrome values are computed from the shares using random polynomials and serve as a separate verification layer that detects falsification without interfering with the core secret sharing mechanism.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #24Intermediary (Mediator)

2Reliability

If technologies from Document 2 or Document 3 are used to detect falsified secret information shares, then the fact that original secret information has not properly been recovered can be detected, but the falsified secret information shares cannot be identified

Engineering Contradiction:
Improvefalsification detection capabilityVSAvoidfalsified share identification information
Core Design Contradiction:
ReliabilityVSLoss of information

Solution Approach 1:

The patent replaces the mechanical verification process (simple check whether recovery succeeded) with a mathematical verification system based on Reed-Solomon error-correcting codes. Instead of merely detecting that recovery failed, the system uses polynomial-based syndrome computation to mathematically identify which specific shares are falsified. This substitution transforms the verification from a binary success/failure outcome to a precise identification of corrupted elements.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #28Mechanics substitution (Replace mechanical system)

Solution Approach 2:

The patent changes the verification parameter from a simple recovery status indicator to syndrome values computed using random polynomials. By introducing these polynomial-based parameters, the system gains the ability to not only detect falsification but to specifically identify which shares are corrupted. The syndrome values serve as new parameters that encode information about the authenticity of each share, enabling precise identification of falsified shares rather than just detecting recovery failure.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #35Parameter changes

3Reliability

If technologies from Document 4 or Document 5 are used to identify falsified secret information shares, then all t falsified secret information shares can be identified with high probability, but the size of the secret information shares becomes very large

Engineering Contradiction:
Improvefalsified share identification accuracyVSAvoidsecret information share size
Core Design Contradiction:
ReliabilityVSQuantity of substance

Solution Approach 1:

The patent applies partial action by generating syndrome values using only t+1 randomly selected points instead of requiring full polynomial verification across all shares. This partial verification approach is sufficient to identify falsified shares with high probability while significantly reducing the computational and storage overhead. The system performs exactly enough verification to achieve the security goal without the excessive complexity of full polynomial reconstruction and verification for all possible share combinations.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #16Partial or excessive action

Solution Approach 2:

The patent changes the share structure by adding compact syndrome values rather than expanding shares with full polynomial information. The syndrome values serve as condensed parameters that capture the essential verification information in a space-efficient manner. By using polynomial-based syndrome computation instead of traditional verification methods, the system achieves high-probability falsified share identification while keeping the additional overhead minimal compared to the total share size.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #35Parameter changes

Data Source

PatentUS20100031128A1Shared information generating apparatus and recovering apparatus
Publication Date: 2010.02.04 NEC CORP
  • US20100031128A1 patent drawing
  • US20100031128A1 patent drawing
  • US20100031128A1 patent drawing

AI summary

There is disclosed a system for identifying falsified secret information shares included in k secret information shares used to recover secret information according to a (k,n)-threshold secret sharing scheme, and producing falsified secret information shares of reduced size. A shared information generating apparatus generates cheater identifying information Ai (i=1, 2, . . . , n) using n secret information shares Vi generated according to the (k,n)-threshold secret sharing scheme and random polynomials. A recovering apparatus detects cheated secret information shares using the arbitrary k secret information shares and k cheater identifying information, and recovers the secret information from the k secret information shares if it detects no cheated secret information shares.