Secret Shuffle Protocol for Encrypted Database Entries

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Solution Overview

Problem

Existing secret shuffle protocols in cloud-based multi-party computation scenarios fail to ensure complete anonymity of encrypted Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) during cross-company benchmarking, as sorting these indicators can reveal relative performance information, posing a risk of data leakage and compromising confidentiality.

Innovation Solution

Implementing secret shuffle protocols using homomorphic encryption, which randomize the order of encrypted inputs without revealing the original order, ensuring that no observer can map elements in the original sequence to their corresponding elements in the shuffled sequence, thereby maintaining anonymity and confidentiality.

Engineering Contradictions & Design Principles

VSEngineering Contradiction Analysis

1Measurement precision

If encrypted KPIs are sorted during cross-company benchmarking, then performance measurement capability is improved, but data confidentiality is compromised due to leakage of relative performance information

Engineering Contradiction:
Improveperformance measurement capabilityVSAvoiddata confidentiality
Core Design Contradiction:
Measurement precisionVSLoss of information

Solution Approach 1:

The patent introduces a secret shuffle protocol as an intermediary mechanism between the KPI data and the benchmarking analysis. This protocol uses homomorphic encryption and oblivious transfer to shuffle the encrypted KPIs in a way that preserves the ability to measure and compare performance while preventing any observer (including the service provider) from determining the original order or ownership of the data. The intermediary shuffling process acts as a barrier that maintains confidentiality while enabling measurement.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #24Intermediary (Mediator)

2Loss of information

If traditional secret shuffle protocols are used, then some level of anonymity is provided, but complete anonymity is not achieved and data leakage risks remain

Engineering Contradiction:
Improveanonymity protectionVSAvoidconfidentiality assurance
Core Design Contradiction:
Loss of informationVSReliability

Solution Approach 1:

The patent changes the cryptographic parameters and protocols used in the secret shuffle process. Specifically, it employs homomorphic encryption schemes that allow mathematical operations on encrypted data without decryption, combined with oblivious transfer protocols. These parameter changes in the cryptographic approach enable complete anonymity by ensuring that even the service provider cannot determine the original order of encrypted KPIs, thereby eliminating data leakage risks while maintaining reliability.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #35Parameter changes

Data Source

PatentUS11368281B2Efficient distributed secret shuffle protocol for encrypted database entries using dependent shufflers
Publication Date: 2022.06.21 SAP SE
  • US11368281B2 patent drawing
  • US11368281B2 patent drawing
  • US11368281B2 patent drawing

AI summary

The present disclosure involves systems, software, and computer implemented methods for a efficient distributed secret shuffle protocol for encrypted database entries using dependent shufflers. Each of multiple clients provides an encrypted client-specific secret input value. A subset of clients are shuffling clients who participate with a service provider in a secret shuffling of the encrypted client-specific secret input values. The protocol includes generation and exchange of random numbers, random permutations and different blinding values. A last protocol step includes using homomorphism, for each client, to perform computations on intermediate encrypted data to homomorphically remove a first blinding value and a second blinding value, to generate a client-specific rerandomized encrypted secret input value. As a result, the client-specific rerandomized encrypted secret input values are generated in an order that is unmapped to an order of receipt, at the service provider, of the encrypted secret input values.