Secure Boot Loader Verification Using Unique Key Firewall

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Solution Overview

Problem

Computing systems face security risks during boot operations due to the potential execution of unauthenticated or malicious boot images, which can lead to system cloning and integrity breaches.

Innovation Solution

A secure boot method that verifies digital signatures and message authentication codes using unique keys, ensuring the integrity and authenticity of boot images by employing a public key for signature verification and a unique key for message authentication, with a unique key firewall to secure the key storage after boot completion.

Engineering Contradictions & Design Principles

VSEngineering Contradiction Analysis

1Reliability

If digital signature verification using public key is implemented, then boot image authenticity is improved, but system complexity increases

Engineering Contradiction:
Improveboot image authenticityVSAvoidverification system complexity
Core Design Contradiction:
ReliabilityVSDevice complexity

Solution Approach 1:

The verification process is segmented into multiple stages: initial boot loader verification, boot loader verification, and kernel verification. Each stage uses appropriate verification methods (public key for initial boot loader, message authentication code for boot loader, both for kernel) to balance security and complexity at different boot phases.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #1Segmentation

Solution Approach 2:

The public key is pre-stored in a secure element within the initial boot loader, and message authentication codes are pre-calculated and embedded in boot images during manufacturing. This preliminary preparation eliminates the need for complex real-time key management during boot verification.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #10Preliminary action

2Reliability

If unique key storage is secured with firewall after boot operation, then security against cloning is improved, but key access complexity increases

Engineering Contradiction:
Improvesystem security against cloningVSAvoidkey access control complexity
Core Design Contradiction:
ReliabilityVSDevice complexity

Solution Approach 1:

The unique key storage implements dynamic access control: during boot operation, the secure element allows read access to the unique key for verification purposes; after boot completion, a firewall mechanism automatically blocks further access. This dynamic behavior provides strong security without requiring complex continuous authentication.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #15Dynamics

Solution Approach 2:

The firewall acts as an intermediary between the unique key storage and the processor. It mediates access requests by allowing them during boot operation and blocking them afterward, simplifying the access control logic while maintaining high security standards.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #24Intermediary (Mediator)

3Reliability

If message authentication code verification is implemented, then boot image integrity is improved, but processing time increases

Engineering Contradiction:
Improveboot image integrityVSAvoidboot operation time
Core Design Contradiction:
ReliabilityVSLoss of time

Solution Approach 1:

Different verification methods are applied to different parts of the boot process based on their specific requirements: public key verification is used for the initial boot loader where authenticity is critical, while message authentication code verification is used for subsequent boot loaders where integrity checking is sufficient and faster.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #3Local quality

Data Source

PatentUS8914627B2Method for generating a secured boot image including an update boot loader for a secured update of the version information
Publication Date: 2014.12.16 SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS CO LTD
  • US8914627B2 patent drawing
  • US8914627B2 patent drawing
  • US8914627B2 patent drawing

AI summary

In a secure boot method, an initial boot loader verifies a first digital signature included in a first boot loader using a public key. The first boot loader is executed if the first digital signature is valid. The first boot loader verifies a first message authentication code included in a second boot loader using a unique key. The second boot loader is executed if the first message authentication code is valid.